OPEN ACCESS
World Journal of Economics, Business and Management
ISSN: 3049-2181 | Vol. 3, No. 11, Nov, 2026
Website: https://wasrpublication.com/index.php/wjebm

The Effect of Leadership and Work Discipline on Lecturer Performance: Performance Allowance as a Moderating Variable at Politeknik XYZ

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Received: 28/08/2026 | Revised: 03/10/2026 | Accepted: 17/10/2026 | Published: 12/11/2026

Abstract: Performance allowance (*tunjangan kinerja*) became part of the remuneration of civil-servant lecturers in Indonesia through Presidential Regulation No. 19 of 2025, yet little is known about how it shapes the drivers of lecturer performance. This study examines the effect of leadership and work discipline on lecturer performance and the moderating role of performance allowance at Politeknik XYZ, a state vocational higher education institution in Indonesia. A cross-sectional survey design was used. The population comprised 178 civil-servant lecturers, and 31 complete questionnaires were obtained (response rate 17.4%). Data were analysed using mean-centered Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) with a 5,000-resample bootstrap robustness check. Work discipline had a positive and significant effect on lecturer performance ($\beta = 0.909$, $p = 0.007$), whereas leadership had no significant direct effect ($\beta = -0.130$, $p = 0.541$). Performance allowance significantly strengthened the effect of leadership on performance ($\beta = 0.869$, $p = 0.006$). Simple slope analysis showed that leadership had a significant negative effect when performance allowance was perceived as low (slope $= -0.691$, $p = 0.032$). Performance allowance did not significantly moderate the effect of work discipline ($\beta = -0.784$, $p = 0.103$), although the interaction was negative. The full model explained 57.6% of the variance in lecturer performance ($R^2 = 0.576$). The study concludes that leadership effectiveness in vocational higher education depends on the perceived fairness and clarity of the performance allowance system. It is recommended that institutions communicate the basis of allowance calculation transparently and align supervisory direction with the performance indicators used to determine the allowance.

Keywords: Leadership; performance allowance; lecturer performance; work discipline.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to the study

Lecturer performance determines the quality of higher education because lecturers carry out three functions at once: teaching, research and community service. Law No. 14 of 2005 on Teachers and Lecturers positions lecturers as professional educators and scientists whose main task is to transform, develop and disseminate knowledge. In polytechnics, this demand is greater because lecturers must also keep learning relevant to the needs of industry.

Since 2025, the reward system for civil-servant (ASN) lecturers has changed markedly. The government issued Presidential Regulation No. 19 of 2025 on Performance Allowances for Employees of the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology, signed on 27 March 2025 and effective retroactively from 1 January 2025 (Tirto.id, 2025a). The allowance received by a lecturer equals the difference between the allowance for the job class and the professional allowance, while performance is assessed per semester (Tirto.id, 2025b; JPNN, 2025). The policy covers 31,066 civil-servant lecturers (Bisnis.com, 2025). Because it is tied directly to performance achievement, the allowance may change how lecturers respond to supervisory direction and disciplinary rules.

Leadership and work discipline are two of the factors most frequently tested in studies of employee performance in Indonesia. Many studies report positive effects of both on performance (Pratiwi et al., 2023; Handayani & Hakim, 2022; Wahyuni et al., 2025). However, findings on leadership are not always consistent. In autonomous professional settings such as academia, the direct influence of supervisors may weaken because core work is governed largely by professional competence and standards (Kerr & Jermier, 1978). This points to the need for a contingency

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variable that explains when leadership and discipline effectively drive performance.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Performance allowance is, in theory, a plausible contingency variable. Expectancy theory holds that effort increases when employees believe performance will lead to valued rewards (Vroom, 1964), and equity theory adds that rewards motivate only when perceived as commensurate with contribution (Adams, 1965). Conversely, motivation crowding theory warns that external rewards can displace intrinsic motivation and voluntary compliance (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Deci et al., 1999). The direction of the moderating effect of the allowance on leadership and discipline therefore cannot be determined a priori.

Prior studies that test allowances as a moderator have mostly examined local-government or corporate employees rather than lecturers, and evidence on lecturers after the implementation of Presidential Regulation No. 19 of 2025 remains very limited. Without such evidence, institutions risk designing allowance and supervision policies that do not reinforce each other. This study addresses this gap at Politeknik XYZ.

1.3 Research objectives

The main objective was to examine the effect of leadership and work discipline on lecturer performance and the moderating role of performance allowance at Politeknik XYZ. The specific objectives were to:

1. Determine the effect of leadership on lecturer performance.
2. Determine the effect of work discipline on lecturer performance.
3. Examine the moderating effect of performance allowance on the relationship between leadership and lecturer performance.
4. Examine the moderating effect of performance allowance on the relationship between work discipline and lecturer performance.

1.4 Research hypotheses

The study tested the following hypotheses:

i. H_1: Leadership has a positive effect on lecturer performance.

ii. H_2: Work discipline has a positive effect on lecturer performance.

iii. H_3: Performance allowance strengthens the effect of leadership on lecturer performance.

iv. H_4: Performance allowance strengthens the effect of work discipline on lecturer performance.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Theoretical framework

The study was guided by expectancy theory, equity theory and motivation crowding theory, complemented by the substitutes-for-leadership perspective. Together they explain why the effects of leadership and discipline on performance may depend on how rewards are perceived.

2.1.1 Expectancy Theory

Expectancy theory proposes that motivation is a function of the belief that effort leads to performance, that performance leads to outcomes, and of the value attached to those outcomes (Vroom, 1964). A performance allowance explicitly links outcomes to performance. When lecturers perceive this link as credible, supervisory direction is more likely to be translated into effort and results.

2.1.2 Equity Theory

Equity theory states that individuals compare the ratio of their outcomes to inputs with that of others (Adams, 1965). Perceived under-reward produces tension that may be reduced by lowering effort. When supervisors demand, monitor and intervene while lecturers perceive their allowance as unfair, leadership pressure may be experienced as an additional burden rather than as support.

2.1.3 Motivation Crowding and Substitutes for Leadership

Motivation crowding theory argues that external interventions such as monetary rewards can crowd out intrinsic motivation and internalised norms (Frey & Jegen, 2001); a meta-analysis by Deci et al. (1999) found that tangible rewards contingent on performance tend to undermine intrinsic motivation. In parallel, Kerr and Jermier (1978) proposed that professional orientation and task characteristics can substitute for, or neutralise, the effects of leadership. Both perspectives suggest that the effects of leadership and discipline may weaken under certain reward conditions.

2.2 Empirical literature

2.2.1 Leadership and lecturer performance

Leadership is the ability to influence a group towards the achievement of a vision or set of goals (Robbins & Judge, 2019). The full-range model distinguishes transformational behaviours, such as role modelling and involving subordinates, from transactional behaviours, such as monitoring deviations and intervening when standards are not met (Bass & Avolio, 1994). Empirical studies generally find a positive effect of leadership on employee performance (Handayani & Hakim, 2022; Ohemeng et al., 2018; Pratiwi et al., 2023).

2.2.2 Work discipline and lecturer performance

Work discipline is the awareness and willingness of employees to comply with organisational rules and prevailing social norms (Hasibuan, 2016 ; Rabie & Elliyana, 2019). For civil servants, disciplinary obligations and sanctions are regulated by Government Regulation No. 94 of 2021. Disciplined employees tend to work more consistently, and positive effects of discipline on performance have been reported for lecturers and other employees (Wahyuni et al., 2025; Pratiwi et al., 2023).

2.2.3 Performance allowance as a moderator

Performance allowance is financial compensation granted on the basis of individual performance and institutional bureaucratic reform. In this study it is measured by its correspondence with contribution, fairness of determination, link to work targets, clarity of mechanism and timeliness of payment. Following expectancy and equity theory, an allowance perceived as fair and clear is expected to strengthen the effects of leadership and discipline; motivation crowding theory, however, allows for the opposite direction for discipline, which this study examines empirically.

2.3 Conceptual framework

Leadership (X_1) and work discipline (X_2) are hypothesised to affect lecturer performance (Y) directly (H_1, H_2), while performance allowance (Z) moderates both paths (H_3: $X_1 \times Z$; H_4: $X_2 \times Z$), as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Authors' own analysis, 2026

3. Research Methodology

3.1 Research design, population and sample

The study adopted a quantitative cross-sectional survey design. The population comprised all 178 lecturers of Politeknik XYZ, consisting of 158 civil servants (PNS) and 20 government employees with work agreements (PPPK), based on staffing data as at 17 September 2026. Respondents were reached through accidental sampling using an online questionnaire distributed in November 2026. A total of 31 lecturers returned complete questionnaires, giving a response rate of 17.4%.

This sample satisfies the minimum ratio of five observations per predictor recommended for regression analysis (Hair et al., 2019), i.e., 5 × 5 predictors = 25 observations, and the lower bound of 30 respondents suggested by Roscoe (1975). Given the modest sample size, the parametric estimates were complemented by a bootstrap with 5,000 resamples.

3.2 Measurement of variables

All variables were measured on a five-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Variable scores were computed as the mean of their items. Table 1 summarises the indicators.

Table 1: Operationalisation of Variables

Variable	Indicators	Items
Leadership (X_1)	Firm task direction, involving subordinates, role modelling, blending with the group, granting autonomy, monitoring deviations, intervening when standards are not met	7
Work discipline (X_2)	Compliance with rules, clear work standards, periodic performance evaluation, firmness of supervisors, application of sanctions	5
Performance allowance (Z)	Correspondence with contribution, fairness of determination, link to work targets, clarity of mechanism, timeliness of payment	5
Lecturer performance (Y)	Target achievement, quality and speed of work, response to workload, procedural compliance, carefulness	5

Source: Authors' own analysis, 2026

3.3 Data analysis

Analysis proceeded in four stages. First, validity was assessed with item-total Pearson correlations and reliability with Cronbach's alpha. Second, classical assumptions were tested: residual normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk), multicollinearity (VIF and tolerance) and heteroscedasticity (Glejser test).

Third, hypotheses were tested using hierarchical Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA). Model 1 contained the direct effects, Model 2 added the moderator and Model 3 added the interaction terms. All predictors were mean-centered before forming the products to reduce structural multicollinearity and ease interpretation of the main effects (Aiken & West, 1991). Model 3 is specified as:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 Z + \beta_4 (X_1 \times Z) + \beta_5 (X_2 \times Z) + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

Fourth, significant interactions were probed with simple slope analysis at low (−1 SD), mean and high (+1 SD) levels of the moderator, and with the Johnson-Neyman technique to identify regions of significance (Hayes, 2018). Hypotheses were supported when $p < 0.05$ and the coefficient had the hypothesised sign.

4. Results

4.1 Respondent profile

Respondents were predominantly young lecturers early in their careers: 58.1% were aged 25–34 years and 77.4% had served 1–5 years. Most held a master's degree and civil-servant status (Table 2).

Table 2: Respondent Profile (n = 31)

Characteristic	Category	Frequency	%
Gender	Female	19	61.3
	Male	12	38.7
Age	25–34 years	18	58.1
	35–44 years	12	38.7
	45–54 years	1	3.2
Education	Master's (S2)	30	96.8
	Doctorate (S3)	1	3.2
Academic rank	Assistant Professor (Asisten Ahli)	18	58.1
	Lecturer (Lektor)	12	38.7
	No rank yet	1	3.2
Length of service	1–5 years	24	77.4
	6–10 years	3	9.7
	11–15 years	2	6.5
	> 15 years	2	6.5
Employment status	Civil servant (PNS)	27	87.1
	PPPK	3	9.7
	Non-civil servant/contract	1	3.2

Source: Authors' own analysis, 2026

4.2 Validity, reliability and descriptive statistics

All items were valid, as their item-total correlations exceeded the critical r of 0.355 (n = 31, α = 0.05, two-tailed) with p < 0.001. All constructs were reliable, with Cronbach's alpha above 0.70. Leadership, work discipline and performance fell in the "good" category (3.41–4.20), while performance allowance fell in the "very good" category (4.21–5.00), as shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Instrument Tests and Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Item-total r	Cronbach's α	Mean	SD	Category
Leadership (X_1)	0.800–0.945	0.951	4.19	0.66	Good
Work discipline (X_2)	0.597–0.832	0.713	4.16	0.46	Good
Performance allowance (Z)	0.783–0.901	0.903	4.23	0.65	Very good
Lecturer performance (Y)	0.736–0.874	0.844	4.06	0.60	Good

Source: Authors' own analysis, 2026

The lowest-scoring performance item was "the amount of work makes me more enthusiastic" (mean 3.68). For the allowance, the lowest score concerned fairness of determination based on workload and position (4.13), and the highest concerned its link to work targets (4.35).

4.3 Classical assumption tests

The model met all classical assumptions. The residuals of Model 3 were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov D = 0.126, p = 0.661; Shapiro-Wilk W = 0.948, p = 0.138). VIF values ranged from 1.44 to 3.60 (tolerance 0.28–0.70), well below 10, indicating no multicollinearity. The Glejser test showed no predictor significantly related to the absolute residuals (p = 0.34–0.53), indicating no heteroscedasticity.

The correlation between leadership and work discipline was fairly high (r = 0.782). This is understandable because several discipline items, such as evaluation and sanctions by supervisors, also reflect leader behaviour. The VIF values nonetheless remained within acceptable limits.

4.4 Moderated regression analysis

Adding the interaction terms significantly increased explanatory power from $R^2 = 0.398$ to 0.576 ($\Delta R^2 = 0.178$, F = 5.254, p = 0.012). Model 3 was jointly significant (F = 6.787, p < 0.001) and explained 57.6% of the variance in lecturer performance (Table 4).

Table 4: Hierarchical Moderated Regression Results

Predictor	Model 1 b (p)	Model 2 b (p)	Model 3 b (SE)	t	p	Std. β
Leadership (X_1)	−0.013 (0.954)	−0.057 (0.811)	−0.130 (0.210)	−0.620	0.541	−0.142
Work discipline (X_2)	0.834 (0.012)	0.856 (0.012)	0.909** (0.306)	2.966	0.007	0.693
Performance allowance (Z)	–	0.081 (0.601)	0.264 (0.145)	1.813	0.082	0.283
$X_1 \times Z$	–	–	0.869** (0.290)	2.998	0.006	0.612
$X_2 \times Z$	–	–	−0.784 (0.464)	−1.691	0.103	−0.386
R^2	0.391	0.398	0.576			
Adjusted R^2	0.348	0.331	0.491			
F (p)	8.997 (0.001)	5.937 (0.003)	6.787 (< 0.001)			

*Note: Unstandardised coefficients; predictors mean-centered. ** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: lecturer performance.*

Source: Authors' own analysis, 2026

The bootstrap with 5,000 resamples led to the same conclusions. The 95% confidence intervals excluded zero for work discipline [0.271; 1.983] and for the $X_1 \times Z$ interaction [0.137; 2.330], but included zero for leadership [−1.076; 0.303], performance allowance [−0.073; 0.575] and the $X_2 \times Z$ interaction [−2.293; 0.409].

4.5 Hypothesis testing summary

Table 5: Summary of Hypothesis Tests

Hypothesis	Path	Coefficient	p-value	Decision
H_1	Leadership → Performance	−0.130	0.541	Not supported
H_2	Work discipline → Performance	0.909	0.007	Supported
H_3	Allowance × Leadership → Performance	0.869	0.006	Supported (strengthening)
H_4	Allowance × Discipline → Performance	−0.784	0.103	Not supported (weakening, n.s.)

Source: Authors' own analysis, 2026

4.6 Simple slope analysis

The effect of leadership reversed direction with perceived allowance. At low allowance, leadership had a significant negative effect on performance; at high allowance, the effect was positive but not significant (Table 6). The Johnson-Neyman technique showed that the negative effect of leadership was significant when the allowance score was below 3.73, a condition observed for 5 respondents (16.1%).

A different pattern emerged for work discipline. Its effect was strongest at low allowance and weakened at high allowance, although the difference across levels was not statistically significant (Figure 2).

Table 6: Simple Slopes at Three Levels of Performance Allowance (SD = 0.645)

Predictor	Allowance level	Slope	SE	t	p-value
Leadership	Low (−1 SD)	−0.691*	0.304	−2.270	0.032
Leadership	Mean	−0.130	0.210	−0.620	0.541
Leadership	High (+1 SD)	0.431	0.256	1.684	0.105
Work discipline	Low (−1 SD)	1.414**	0.506	2.798	0.010
Work discipline	Mean	0.909**	0.306	2.966	0.007
Work discipline	High (+1 SD)	0.403	0.333	1.209	0.238

Note: $p < 0.05$; $p < 0.01$

Source: Authors' own analysis, 2026




Figure 2: Interaction of Performance Allowance with Leadership and Work Discipline

Source: Authors' own analysis, 2026

5. Discussion

5.1 Leadership and lecturer performance

Leadership had no significant direct effect on lecturer performance, so H_1 was not supported. This differs from studies of government and corporate employees that report positive effects (Handayani & Hakim, 2022; Pratiwi et al., 2023). The difference can be explained by the nature of academic work: lecturers' core tasks are professional and autonomous, so competence and professional standards may substitute for direct supervisory direction (Kerr & Jermier, 1978).

The moderation results show that the effect of leadership is not truly zero but is masked by two opposing directions. Among lecturers who perceive their allowance as low, leadership is negatively related to performance; among those who perceive it as high, the relationship turns positive. The near-zero average effect is the net result of these two groups.

5.2 Work discipline and lecturer performance

Work discipline had a positive and significant effect on lecturer performance, so H_2 was supported. Discipline was the strongest predictor in the model (standardised $\beta = 0.693$). This is consistent with Wahyuni et al. (2025) for lecturers and Pratiwi et al. (2023) for state-enterprise employees. Lecturers who comply with rules, have clear work standards and are evaluated periodically tend to meet their targets more effectively.

This finding is relevant to a sample dominated by assistant professors with one to five years of service. At an early career stage, clear rules and standards help lecturers understand institutional expectations, so discipline acts directly as a guide to performance.

5.3 Performance allowance as a moderator of leadership

Performance allowance strengthened the effect of leadership on performance, so H_3 was supported. This supports expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964): supervisory direction is more readily translated into performance when lecturers believe that performance will be appropriately rewarded.

A more important finding is the negative effect of leadership among lecturers who perceive their allowance as low, consistent with equity theory (Adams, 1965). When supervisors demand, monitor and intervene while lecturers feel under-rewarded relative to their contribution, leadership pressure may be perceived as an additional burden, and intensive leadership is followed by lower performance. The effectiveness of leadership at Politeknik XYZ therefore depends on the credibility of the allowance system, whose weakest dimension was fairness of determination based on workload and position.

5.4 Performance allowance as a moderator of work discipline

Performance allowance did not significantly moderate the effect of work discipline, so H_4 was not supported. Although not significant, the interaction was negative, opposite to the hypothesised direction: discipline drove performance most strongly when the allowance was perceived as low and weakened when it was perceived as high.

This pattern is in line with motivation crowding theory (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Deci et al., 1999). When financial rewards are considered adequate, performance appears to be driven more by the allowance itself, reducing the role of discipline; when the allowance is considered insufficient, discipline and adherence to standards become the main support of performance. Because this interaction was not significant with 31 lecturers, it should be confirmed with a larger sample.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusion

Work discipline is the main driver of lecturer performance at Politeknik XYZ, whereas leadership becomes effective only in combination with perceptions of the performance allowance. Specifically: (1) leadership had no significant direct effect on performance; (2) work discipline had a positive and significant effect; (3) performance allowance strengthened the effect of leadership, turning a negative effect at low allowance into a positive effect at high allowance; and (4) performance allowance did not significantly moderate the effect of discipline, although the interaction tended to be weakening.

6.2 Recommendations

i. Institutional leaders should communicate the basis of calculation and the determination mechanism of the performance allowance openly, particularly its fairness with respect to workload and position.

ii. Supervisory direction and evaluation should be aligned with the performance indicators that determine the allowance, so that leadership and rewards reinforce each other.

iii. Clear and consistent disciplinary systems should be maintained, as discipline remains the main support of performance when the allowance is perceived as inadequate.

iv. Policymakers at the ministry level should monitor how the semester-based assessment of lecturer allowances is perceived, since perceived unfairness can neutralise or reverse the effect of leadership.

6.3 Limitations and future research

This study has several limitations. First, the sample covered only 31 of 178 lecturers (17.4%) obtained through accidental sampling, so generalisation should be made with caution. Second, all variables were self-reported at a single point in time, raising the possibility of common method bias. Third, several discipline items include supervisor behaviour and are therefore highly correlated with leadership. Future research should use larger samples or a census, objective performance data such as lecturer workload reports (BKD) or individual performance targets (SKP), and a clearer separation between discipline and leadership indicators.

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