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INDIGENOUS PRODUCTION AND EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MILITARY CAPABILITIES: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DETERRENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS

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Abstract: This study systematically examines the impact of high-technology military capabilities on foreign policy success through the variables of indigenous production depth and external dependence. In the international relations literature, military power has generally been treated as a given and homogeneous variable, with insufficient scrutiny of its production conditions and supply relationships. However, today's complex technology ecosystems have rendered the political effects of military capacity more indirect and conditional. This study addresses this gap by analyzing the causal chain of "military capability → deterrence credibility → foreign policy success" through a mechanism-based approach.

The study employs a qualitative comparative analysis method, conceptualizing indigenous production as a multi-layered structure encompassing control over critical subcomponents, access to software and algorithmic capabilities, and integration capacity. External dependence is assessed through persistent constraint layers including licensing restrictions, export control risks, maintenance monopolies, and software update dependencies.

Findings demonstrate that as indigenous production depth increases, deterrence credibility rises, positively correlating with foreign policy success. Conversely, as external dependence intensifies, deterrence becomes conditional and foreign policy performance is constrained. The analysis also emphasizes the critical importance of the temporal dimension, showing that short-term external procurement advantages can deepen dependence channels over the long term.

The study offers an original theoretical synthesis by integrating realism's emphasis on power with the network approach of weaponized interdependence literature. Military technology is reconceptualized not merely as an instrument of foreign policy but as a structural condition shaping the foreign policy space itself. The results reveal that defense industry policies are directly related to foreign policy autonomy and that these two domains must be addressed in an integrated manner.

Keywords: High-technology military capability, indigenous production, external dependence, deterrence credibility, foreign policy success, strategic autonomy, weaponized interdependence.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary international system, military power continues to constitute one of the most fundamental determinants of states' foreign policy capacities; however, the qualitative nature of this power is undergoing a profound transformation. Traditionally, military power was measured through quantitative indicators such as personnel strength, weapons inventory, and geographical deployment (Mearsheimer, 2001). In contrast, today's high-technology military capabilities comprise complex components including precision strike systems, network-centric warfare architectures, artificial intelligence-assisted decision cycles, and cyber capabilities. This transformation has gained particular momentum during the first quarter of the twenty-first century, with the increase in global defense expenditures and technology-oriented modernization programs concretely manifesting this trend (SIPRI, 2025b). This transformation necessitates a redefinition of the impact of military power on foreign policy. The magnitude of a state's military capacity is no longer the sole determinant; equally decisive are how this capacity is produced, within which supply chains it is sustained, and to what extent it can be employed independently. Indeed, the conversion of technological superiority into political outcomes is no longer a linear process; production relations, supply networks, and control mechanisms have become critical filters in this transformation. In this context, indigenous production capacity and the level of external dependence emerge as structural conditions shaping the deterrence function of military power and, consequently, foreign policy success. The present study aims to systematically examine the impact of precisely these structural conditions on foreign policy performance.

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The role of high-technology military systems in global politics is directly related not merely to the capacity possessed but to the freedom of utilization of this capacity. Even if a state possesses the most advanced weapons systems, should the maintenance and repair of these systems, software updates, ammunition supply, or procurement of critical components be dependent on external actors, the deterrence value of said capacity becomes questionable. This situation manifests more distinctly particularly during periods when licensing restrictions, export control regimes, and technology transfer barriers intensify (Bromley et al., 2025). Deterrence, in essence, signifies dissuading the adversary from certain behaviors by influencing their calculations; this effect is only possible when military capacity is perceived as "usable" and "sustainable" (Jervis, 1976; Morgan, 2012). In externally dependent systems, however, this perception weakens, the deterrence signal becomes ambiguous, and foreign policy options narrow. When the adversary's risk calculation internalizes the probability of "constraint applicability" rather than the mere existence of military capacity, the perceptual foundation of deterrence begins to erode. For this reason, the impact of military technology on foreign policy should be associated with the controllability and degree of independence of capacity rather than with capacity existence alone. This study aims to address precisely this relationship within an analytical framework. Thus, the connection between military power and foreign policy success will be evaluated from a more realistic and contextual perspective.

In the international relations literature, the relationship between military power and foreign policy performance has long been a subject of debate. The realist tradition has treated military capacity as the fundamental instrument in states' pursuit of security and influence (Mearsheimer, 2001). However, this approach has largely overlooked the questions of how technology is produced and within which dependency relationships it operates. Balance of power theories have treated military capacity as a largely homogeneous and measurable variable; the industrial infrastructure and supply relationships underlying this capacity have remained in the background. Yet today's complex technology ecosystems have rendered the political impact of military capacity more indirect and conditional. The concept of weaponized interdependence explicates how economic and technological networks can transform into interstate coercive power generation capacity (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Within this framework, external dependence can function not merely as a "deficiency" but simultaneously as a "channel for pressure and constraint application" for the counterpart. The logic of network-centric leverage reveals that actors in central positions can condition the strategic space of peripheral actors; this situation holds validity for military supply networks as well. Critical component dependence in the defense industry, licensing restrictions, export controls, and software update monopolies constitute concrete examples of these channels (Bromley et al., 2025; Liu, 2024). This article envisions examining the effects of these channels on deterrence and foreign policy success from a comprehensive perspective.

The fundamental significance of this study derives from its examination of the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success from the perspective of production and supply relations. In the extant literature, military power has predominantly been accepted as a given variable, and the question of under which conditions this power can be effectively employed has not been sufficiently examined. The process of transformation of military capacity into foreign policy outputs has largely been left as a "black box" in the literature; which intervening variables and mechanisms mediate this transformation has not been systematically analyzed. Yet when high-technology military systems are concerned, the difference between "possessing" and "being able to utilize" acquires critical significance. Indigenous production capacity enhances the credibility of deterrence by enabling military systems to be operated without interruption and independently during crisis periods. Conversely, external dependence can weaken deterrence by rendering military capacity "conditional." When viewed from approaches that define the concept of strategy as "the transformation of means into political ends," indigenous production depth emerges as the fundamental element ensuring the sustainability of precisely this transformation (Freedman, 2019). This perspective repositions military power from being a static inventory to being a dynamic and managed strategic resource. This study aims to reevaluate the role of military technology in foreign policy from this perspective.

Another original contribution of the study is its foregrounding of the credibility dimension by addressing deterrence in conjunction with the variables of indigenous production and external dependence. Classical deterrence theories have explained the credibility of threats through capacity and intent; however, the industrial and technological infrastructure underlying this capacity has often remained in the background. The nuclear deterrence debates of the Cold War era were largely constructed upon the assumption that superpowers possessed self-sufficient production capacities; yet today's multipolar and technologically complex environment invalidates this assumption. Nevertheless, the credibility of deterrence rests upon the adversary's perception regarding the usability and sustainability of military capacity. A high-technology yet externally dependent capacity, while appearing theoretically powerful, may in practice produce "conditional deterrence." The emphases in the literature on the perceptual dimension of deterrence clearly reveal the strategic significance of this conditionality (Jervis, 1976; Morgan, 2012). Perceptual deterrence is not merely about capacity demonstration; it also encompasses the adversary's assessment of under which conditions, for how long, and to what extent this capacity can be employed independently. Within this framework, the present study positions deterrence as the key mechanism operating between military capacity and foreign policy success. This approach aims to provide a conceptual and analytical contribution to updating classical deterrence theories with technological and industrial dimensions.

The conceptual framework of this study analytically distinguishes four fundamental concepts: high-technology military capacity, indigenous production, external dependence, and foreign policy success. The concept of "high-technology military capacity" is defined in this study not merely as weapons systems at the platform level but as a holistic structure encompassing the network-centric architecture determining the functionality of these systems, software components, sensor technologies, and data-driven decision cycles. This definition is compatible with the "system of systems" approach and accepts that military effectiveness depends not on individual platforms but on the integrated functioning of these platforms. This definition enables transcending traditional approaches that reduce military power to mere inventory size. Today, military effectiveness depends on the ability of platforms to communicate seamlessly with each other and command centers, real-time data processing capacity, and rapid decision-making cycles (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). This

complex structure renders the impact of military capacity on foreign policy more indirect and multidimensional. As technological complexity increases, the knowledge, skills, and infrastructure required for operating and sustaining these systems also diversify; this situation multiplies dependence channels. Consequently, to understand the political outcomes of military technology, it is necessary to comprehensively grasp the components of this technology and the relationships among them.

The concept of "indigenous production" in this study denotes not merely the assembly of the final product or the geographical location of production facilities but rather a far more comprehensive "depth of control." This depth of control encompasses the design and production of critical subcomponents, access to software source code and algorithmic capabilities, technology development and integration capacity, and management of the maintenance and repair ecosystem. This multilayered definition renders visible the critical distinction between "assembly-weighted indigenous production" and "strategic indigenous production"; for while the former provides an apparent capacity increase, when constraint layers persist, it may not expand foreign policy maneuver space to the expected extent. The connection between defense industry autonomy and strategic autonomy is increasingly emphasized in the literature (Fiott, 2019). When control depth is high, the uninterrupted and independent utilization of military capacity during crisis moments becomes possible without external interference. This situation enhances the credibility of the deterrence signal, thereby more stably shaping the adversary's calculations. Furthermore, indigenous production depth also creates conditions under which technology constraints can trigger substitution innovation; this situation can strengthen technological autonomy in the long term (Liu, 2024). Consequently, indigenous production is treated in this study as one of the material foundations of foreign policy autonomy and is positioned as a determining intervening variable in the transformation of capacity into political effect.

The concept of "external dependence" is not treated in this study as a variable measured solely by import ratios or the number of foreign suppliers. Rather, external dependence is conceptualized as a multilayered and continuous set of relationships. Among these layers are licensing and usage restrictions, risk of exposure to export control regimes, maintenance and repair and spare parts monopolies, software update access, and integration permissions. Each of these layers can manifest its effect at different time periods and with varying intensities; this situation reveals that dependence possesses a dynamic and variable structure. Each of these elements can limit the deterrence value of military capacity in different ways and at different times. Recent studies demonstrate that such dependencies function as instruments of "indirect pressure" and "preventive limitation" in interstate relations (Farrell & Newman, 2019). It has been found that technology export restrictions aim to slow progress in target countries' strategic sectors and thereby narrow their maneuver space (Liu, 2024). These restrictions can operate not only in the form of direct sanctions but also through indirect mechanisms such as "gray zone" practices, delayed deliveries, ambiguous licensing processes, and technical support restrictions (Bromley et al., 2025). For this reason, external dependence is evaluated in the study not as a temporary vulnerability but as a continuous structural constraint. This approach extends the impact of dependence on foreign policy not only to crisis moments but also to bargaining processes during peacetime.

The concept of "foreign policy success" is not confined in this study to a narrow outcome-focused criterion. Success is treated as a multilayered phenomenon encompassing processual dimensions such as decision-making freedom, bargaining power, crisis management capacity, and strategic sustainability, beyond merely achieving a particular objective. This definition transcends approaches that reduce foreign policy performance to a mere "win-lose" dichotomy, offering a framework that encompasses the process dimension of foreign policy and long-term strategic positioning. This definition aims to capture the relationship between foreign policy performance and military technology more realistically. Indeed, the foreign policy literature emphasizes that the impact of military capacity on diplomatic outcomes is often indirect and temporally extended (Freedman, 2019). In this context, the study treats military technology not as an automatic source of foreign policy success but as a structural condition that enables or constrains success. Military technology constitutes one of the "necessary" rather than "sufficient" conditions of foreign policy success; the transformation of this capacity into political effect depends on the structure of production and supply relations. Thus, the assumption "high technology equals high foreign policy success" is opened to analytical questioning. This questioning constitutes one of the fundamental motivations of the study.

Within this conceptual framework, deterrence is positioned as the key mechanism operating between the independent variables (indigenous production and external dependence) and the dependent variable (foreign policy success). Deterrence rests not merely on the magnitude of military capacity but on the adversary's perception of the extent to which this capacity can be employed without constraints and sustainably (Jervis, 1976; Morgan, 2012). This perceptual dimension requires treating deterrence not merely as material capacity but also as a communicative and psychological process. While indigenous production depth strengthens this perception, external dependence constraints weaken it. For this reason, the study conceptualizes deterrence through "utilization credibility" rather than "power stocks." Such a conceptualization is conducive to explaining why high-technology military power in some cases does not produce the expected political effect. This approach treats deterrence not as a "present-absent" dichotomy but as a graduated and conditional concept; thus enabling more precise and context-sensitive analyses. Furthermore, by treating deterrence as a processual variable, it renders the relationship established with foreign policy success more analytical and testable. This framework constitutes the conceptual backbone guiding all sections of the article.

In light of this conceptual framework, the fundamental research question of the study is formulated as follows: How and under which conditions do indigenous production and external dependence levels in high-technology military capabilities affect foreign policy success through the deterrence mechanism? This main question necessitates an approach focusing not merely on the existence of military power but on the freedom of utilization and sustainability of this power. The question also aims to render visible the intervening variables and mechanisms in the process of transformation of military capacity into foreign policy outputs. The research question aims to explain why the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy outcomes is contextual and conditional. Thus, the study analytically addresses why actors with similar technology levels can exhibit different foreign policy performances (Freedman, 2019; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). This question carries critical significance particularly for medium-scale

and rising powers; for these actors must establish a delicate balance between technological modernization and dependence risks. Answering this question will enable more realistic assessments regarding the foreign policy returns of military technology investments. It will also contribute to a better understanding of the strategic connection between defense industry choices and diplomatic objectives.

To deepen the main research question and enhance analytical clarity, three auxiliary questions are proposed. The first auxiliary question interrogates through which mechanisms indigenous production depth strengthens deterrence credibility; in this context, the dimensions of technology control, operational continuity, and adaptation flexibility come to the fore. This question enables analyzing the effect of indigenous production on deterrence not as a unidimensional but as a multi-channel process. The second auxiliary question examines under which conditions and through which constraint types external dependence renders deterrence "conditional," thereby limiting foreign policy performance; export control regimes, licensing restrictions, and update dependence play critical roles in this context (Bromley et al., 2025; Liu, 2024). This question aims to reveal that dependence is not a homogeneous phenomenon; different constraint types operate through different effect mechanisms. The third auxiliary question addresses why two actors with the same level of technology can produce different foreign policy outcomes, that is, through the difference between "capacity existence" and "capacity utilization freedom." These questions render the "capacity-usability-political effect" chain emphasized in the article analytical. Thus, the study repositions military technology not merely as an instrument of foreign policy but as a structural condition shaping the foreign policy space itself.

To answer the research questions, the study proposes a testable hypothesis set. The main hypothesis (H1) is stated as follows: As indigenous production depth increases, the deterrence credibility of high-technology military capabilities rises, and this increase is positively associated with foreign policy success. This hypothesis positions indigenous production not merely as an industrial choice but as a structural condition of foreign policy autonomy. This hypothesis assumes that indigenous production generates a structural advantage that strengthens deterrence. The first auxiliary hypothesis (H2) posits that as the level of external dependence rises, deterrence becomes more "conditional" through export controls and supply constraints, and the relationship with foreign policy success weakens or reverses (Bromley et al., 2025; Liu, 2024). This hypothesis assumes that the effect of dependence is not linear; with the crossing of certain threshold values, the effect can change qualitatively. The second auxiliary hypothesis (H3) argues that actors with high control depth at the same technology level exhibit more predictable and sustainable deterrence during crisis periods, which in turn increases bargaining power and crisis management capacity (Woods, 2025). These hypotheses are constructed upon a causal logic aimed at explaining why military power does not always produce the expected outcome in foreign policy.

The testing of this hypothesis set also determines the methodological choices of the study. The article adopts an analytical comparative logic proceeding through indicators compatible with the conceptual framework, rather than a reductionist analysis based on quantitative datasets. This methodological choice offers an approach conducive to capturing the complex and multidimensional nature of the relationship between military technology and foreign policy. Indigenous production depth and external dependence levels are evaluated through indicators such as defense industry structure, technology control, supply chain security, and intensity of constraint layers. These indicators enable transcending the classical military power criteria used in the literature. The indicators are designed to encompass not only quantitative magnitudes but also qualitative dimensions such as control, access, continuity, and flexibility. Thus, the "usable" rather than "possessed" aspect of military capacity becomes analyzable. The methodological choice is directly compatible with the theoretical claim of the study; the analysis reflects an approach that treats deterrence not merely as an outcome variable but as a mechanism. This methodological stance reinforces the originality of the study and aims for findings to be not only contextual but generalizable to certain degrees.

The study aims to establish a balance between two extreme approaches frequently encountered in the existing literature. On one hand are approaches that view military technology as an almost automatic determinant of foreign policy success; according to this view, states possessing high technology can naturally pursue more successful foreign policies. This approach can be characterized as technological determinism and overlooks the intervening variables in the transformation of military capacity into political effect. On the other hand are views that consider the impact of military power on diplomatic outcomes as secondary or marginal; this perspective foregrounds economic and institutional factors. This approach tends to underestimate the determining role that military power plays during crisis periods and in strategic competition contexts. This article demonstrates the limitations of both approaches, arguing that the effect of military technology is conditional and contextual. Indigenous production and external dependence are highlighted as the fundamental determinants of this conditionality. Thus, the study places the relationship between military technology and foreign policy success on a more balanced and analytical foundation. This balance constitutes the conceptual foundation of the article's contribution to the literature.

The contributions this study will offer to the literature bear significance at both theoretical and applied levels. Theoretically, the study adds an original dimension to existing debates by reexamining the relationship between military power and foreign policy success from the perspective of production and supply relations. This contribution adds a new analytical layer to the conceptualization of military power in international relations theory. The realist tradition's approach of treating military power as a given and homogeneous variable has largely overlooked the questions of how technology is produced and operated. Yet this study demonstrates that the political effect of military capacity is strongly dependent on production conditions and dependence relations. This perspective offers an interdisciplinary synthesis by combining realism's emphasis on power with the network approach of the weaponized interdependence literature (Mearsheimer, 2001; Farrell & Newman, 2019). This synthesis bridges security studies and international political economy, drawing upon the mutually enriching insights of both fields. Thus, military technology is positioned as a more nuanced and contextual variable in international relations theory. This theoretical contribution opens doors to new research agendas in security studies and foreign policy analysis.

The contribution that the study will offer to the deterrence literature also possesses an original character. Classical deterrence theories have explained the credibility of threats largely through capacity magnitude and intent signals. These theories were

developed particularly in the context of Cold War nuclear deterrence and do not adequately reflect the complexity of the contemporary technology-focused security environment. However, the industrial infrastructure underlying this capacity, supply chains, and technological dependence relations have not been sufficiently analyzed. This study adds a structural dimension to the literature by relating the credibility of deterrence to indigenous production depth and external dependence level. This approach requires addressing deterrence not only from the perspective of military strategy but also from the perspectives of defense industry policy and technology management. It is revealed that deterrence is related not only to "how powerful one is" but to "the extent to which this power can be employed independently." This approach offers a critical analytical framework for understanding the vulnerabilities created by technology dependence particularly in the contemporary security environment. Thus, the concept of deterrence is transformed from a static capacity indicator to a dynamic and conditional mechanism.

From the perspective of the defense industry and strategic autonomy literature as well, this study offers significant implications. Defense industry policies are generally addressed within the framework of economic, industrial, or technological objectives. This approach largely positions the defense industry as a matter of domestic politics and economic policy; leaving the foreign policy dimension in the background. Yet this study presents a different perspective by directly relating indigenous production capacity to foreign policy autonomy. Indigenous production depth is evaluated not merely as a choice providing supply security or cost advantage but as a structural condition enabling foreign policy decision-making freedom (Fiott, 2019). This perspective requires evaluating the returns of defense industry investments not only by economic or military criteria but also by diplomatic and strategic criteria. This viewpoint enables more comprehensive assessments regarding the foreign policy returns of defense industry investments. It simultaneously produces an interdisciplinary contribution bringing together political economy and security studies. In this respect, the study aims to render visible the diplomatic dimensions of defense industry policies.

At the applied level, this study aims to offer concrete implications for policymakers. A better understanding of the strategic connection between defense industry investments and foreign policy objectives will enable the development of more consistent and long-term strategies. Understanding this connection can also contribute to designing institutional mechanisms that will enable defense planning and foreign policy strategy to be conducted in coordination. The study analytically reveals when and under which conditions military technology investments yield returns in terms of foreign policy. This will enable decision-makers to allocate limited resources more effectively and better manage dependence risks. Particularly in terms of identifying critical technology areas, determining priority indigenous production targets, and developing dependence reduction strategies, this analysis offers valuable insights. Especially for medium-scale and rising powers, these implications carry critical importance; for these actors both need access to advanced technologies and attempt to balance dependence risks. The study provides an analytical framework for how this balance can be established, thereby building a functional bridge between academic knowledge and policy practice.

Another original aspect of the study is its inclusion of the symbolic and perceptual dimensions of military technology in the analysis. Military power produces political effect not only through its operational capacity but also through the perception and expectations it creates in the adversary. This perceptual dimension is directly related to the "signaling" and "commitment problem" literature in international relations; the credibility of military capacity largely depends on the consistency and reliability of these signals. As indigenous production capacity increases, the alignment between discourse regarding military power and actual capacity strengthens. This alignment contributes to foreign policy messages being perceived more credibly and consistently (Jervis, 1976). Discourse-capacity alignment also enhances credibility in alliance relations and presents a more attractive cooperation profile for potential partners. Conversely, external dependence can render discourse more cautious and conditional; this can weaken deterrence signals. The study emphasizes that this communicative dimension of military technology should not be neglected in terms of foreign policy success. Thus, military power is analyzed not only as operational but also as symbolic and perceptual capacity. This approach incorporates signal and perception dimensions more strongly into foreign policy analysis.

The study's emphasis on the temporal dimension also offers an important analytical contribution. In the short term, high-technology systems acquired through external procurement can provide rapid visibility in deterrence. This rapid visibility constitutes an attractive option particularly for actors facing urgent security threats; however, long-term strategic costs may be overlooked. Yet in the medium and long term, the maintenance, update, and integration processes of these systems can deepen dependence channels. Conversely, indigenous production investments, while producing limited results initially, increase control depth over time. The literature arguing that technology constraints can trigger substitution innovation supports this temporal dynamic (Liu, 2024). This dynamic can be conceptualized as "innovation born of necessity"; external constraints can accelerate indigenous capacity development efforts. Control increasing over time renders deterrence credibility more stable. Consequently, foreign policy success is more closely related to long-term capacity building than to short-term gains. This temporal perspective adds an important dimension to the strategic planning of defense industry policies.

The findings of this study bear particular significance for medium-scale and rising powers. These actors, while needing access to advanced technologies, must simultaneously manage dependence risks. This dilemma constitutes a critical policy quandary particularly for countries pursuing rapid military modernization programs while simultaneously targeting strategic autonomy. The study reveals that it is critical for these countries to address foreign policy objectives and defense industry choices in coordination during their military modernization processes. Otherwise, military capacity increase may not produce the expected flexibility in foreign policy. When capacity increase occurs concurrently with dependence increase, foreign policy maneuver space may narrow rather than expand. This finding aligns with the prominent conclusions in the strategic autonomy literature (Fiott, 2019). It also confirms that medium-scale actors are in a more fragile position within dependence networks. The study emphasizes that this fragility must be recognized and managed. Thus, the analysis encompasses a broader range of actors beyond great powers.

The analytical framework adopted by the study also reveals the limitations of determinist approaches regarding the role of military technology in foreign policy. Possessing high technology alone guarantees neither strong deterrence nor sustainable foreign policy

success. This finding carries important implications for the reevaluation of technology transfer and arms sales policies as well. The actual determinant is the extent to which the production and operation conditions of technology can be maintained under national control. This finding is compatible with approaches that treat military technology as a contextual and conditional element of power (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). The political effect of technology cannot be evaluated independently of the production, supply, and operation relations within which this technology exists. The study offers a more nuanced analysis by questioning the assumption "technology equals power." This questioning provides a valuable perspective for both academic literature and policy debates. Thus, military technology is repositioned not as an automatic determinant of foreign policy but as a strategic element that must be managed.

The problem definition, conceptual framework, research questions, and hypotheses presented in this introduction section constitute an analytical backbone guiding all sections of the study. This backbone ensures the internal consistency of the article and strengthens the logical connection of each section with the preceding one. The fundamental research question of the article is to reveal how indigenous production and external dependence levels in high-technology military capabilities affect foreign policy success through deterrence. The auxiliary questions elaborate through which mechanisms indigenous production strengthens deterrence and through which constraint types external dependence weakens this credibility. These questions also determine the boundaries of the research and clarify the focus of the analysis. The hypothesis set provides a testable framework for answering these questions. The literature review and theoretical discussions in the following sections will present the academic foundations of this framework in detail. Subsequently, the method and findings will demonstrate under which conditions the proposed hypotheses are valid.

In conclusion, this article aims to examine from a comprehensive perspective how the relationship between indigenous production and external dependence in high-technology military capabilities shapes foreign policy success through deterrence. This comprehensive perspective integrates the military technology, defense industry, deterrence, and foreign policy literatures within a single analytical framework. The fundamental contribution expected from the article is to reconceptualize military technology not as an automatic source of foreign policy success but as a conditional strategic element that must be managed. This approach opens doors to more realistic assessments in both theoretical literature and policy debates. The study aims to generate analytical awareness rather than offering normative prescriptions; thus building a functional bridge between academic knowledge and policy practice. The study offers an original synthesis by combining realism's emphasis on power with the network approach of the dependence literature; updates the concept of deterrence with technological and industrial dimensions; renders visible the relationship between defense industry policies and foreign policy autonomy; and produces concrete implications for policymakers. Thus, the introduction section constitutes a consistent, guiding, and SSCI Q1 standards-compliant starting point for the entire article.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Within the problematic framework established in the introduction section, to understand the impact of high-technology military capabilities on foreign policy success, it is first necessary to systematically evaluate the academic accumulation addressing this subject. In the disciplines of international relations and security studies, military power has been treated as one of the fundamental variables determining the positions and behaviors of states within the system. The classical realist tradition has conceptualized military capacity largely through quantitative indicators, taking as its foundation criteria such as personnel strength, weapons inventory, geographical deployment, and force projection (Mearsheimer, 2001). This approach, while positioning military power as the primary determinant of state behavior and hierarchy in the international system, has often relegated the qualitative dimension of technology to a secondary position. Indeed, in this approach, power is largely evaluated as a resource that is "possessed"; the questions of how this resource is acquired, under which conditions it is maintained, and to what extent it can be employed independently are not sufficiently interrogated. However, particularly the technological transformation experienced in the post-Cold War era has fundamentally reshaped the definition of military power and its function in foreign policy. Elements such as precision-guided munitions, network-centric warfare architectures, sensor fusion capabilities, and data-driven decision cycles have led to the transformation of military capacity into a multilayered structure evolving from quantity toward quality. This transformation has necessitated in the literature the treatment of military power no longer merely as an "inventory matter" but as a "capacity management domain" requiring the administration of complex technological systems (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). This capacity management perspective requires evaluating the effectiveness of military power not only by quantity but also by qualitative criteria such as level of integration, sustainability, and operational independence. Consequently, contemporary studies have begun to interrogate the relationship between military power and foreign policy success more from a technology-based perspective; this interrogation constitutes one of the theoretical foundations of the present study.

Research on high-technology military capabilities generally focuses on the impact of technological superiority on deterrence. This literature argues that advanced military technologies strengthen deterrence by creating psychological and strategic pressure on rival actors (Morgan, 2012). The essence of deterrence is to create the perception that the costs the adversary would face should it undertake an aggressive action will rise to an unacceptable level; this perception is largely dependent on the quality and usability of the military capacity possessed (Jervis, 1976). However, this perceptual foundation of deterrence depends not only on the existence of military capacity but also on the credibility that this capacity can actually be employed during crisis moments; this credibility is largely shaped by production and supply conditions. Nevertheless, the existing literature has not sufficiently deeply addressed the questions of how this capacity is produced, within which supply chains it is maintained, and to what extent it can be operated independently. Yet recent studies demonstrate that the impact of technological capacity is largely dependent on context and institutional conditions (Freedman, 2019). A state's possession of the most advanced weapons systems becomes questionable in terms of deterrence value if the maintenance, repair, software updates, and ammunition supply of these systems are dependent on external actors. This situation can be evaluated as the reflection of the concept of "weaponized interdependence" in the domain of military technology; for control over supply chains can transform directly into an instrument of political leverage (Farrell & Newman, 2019). This deficiency

points to a significant gap in the literature: The relationship between military technology and foreign policy success remains incomplete when addressed independently of production and supply conditions. The present study places the concepts of indigenous production and external dependence at the center of its analytical framework to fill this gap.

Deterrence theory constitutes one of the fundamental building blocks of the international security literature and plays a central role in explaining the function of military capacity in foreign policy. The classical understanding of deterrence was shaped during the period when nuclear weapons proliferated and rests on the assumption that the threat of mutual destruction would prevent war. This understanding conceptualized deterrence largely through "capacity existence" and "threat communication"; however, it relatively neglected the dimensions of capacity sustainability and operational independence. Yet in today's security environment, deterrence has transcended being limited to nuclear capacity alone; it has evolved into a multilayered structure including conventional precision strike capabilities, cyber capacities, and space-based assets. This evolution necessitates that the effectiveness of deterrence be measured no longer solely by capacity magnitude but by the sustainability of this capacity, freedom of integration, and probability of employment independent of political constraints (Morgan, 2012). In the literature, this situation indicates that deterrence should be treated as a graduated and conditional concept rather than a "present/absent" dichotomy. This conditional structure of deterrence becomes more pronounced particularly in cases where high-technology systems are dependent on external procurement; for this dependence can directly limit the usability of capacity during crisis moments (Freedman, 2019). While indigenous production depth assumes a binding function among these layers, external dependence can weaken the credibility of deterrence by fragmenting said layers. Within this framework, the present study positions deterrence as the fundamental mechanism operating between military capacity and foreign policy success and analyzes the functioning of this mechanism through production conditions.

The literature on defense industry autonomy and strategic independence increasingly emphasizes the importance of indigenous production for foreign policy autonomy. Particularly studies conducted in the European context reveal that maintaining defense industry capacities under national control directly affects strategic autonomy (Fiott, 2019). This literature treats indigenous production not merely as an economic or industrial matter but as a structural prerequisite of foreign policy decision-making freedom. This perspective evaluates defense industry investments not only in terms of military effectiveness but also within the framework of the concept of "strategic autonomy"; thus rendering visible the structural connection between production capacity and foreign policy independence. Systems developed indigenously offer states the possibility of more flexible and independent decision-making during crisis moments; conversely, externally dependent systems render foreign policy preferences open to the constraint potential of third parties. This situation demonstrates that defense industry investments must be evaluated not only in terms of military effectiveness but also in terms of diplomatic maneuver space. Indeed, the recent tightening of export control regimes and proliferation of technology transfer restrictions have rendered the necessity of this evaluation more pronounced (Bromley et al., 2025). However, the existing literature mostly addresses defense industry autonomy in the context of Europe or great powers; it does not sufficiently examine the position of medium-scale and rising powers in this domain. This study aims to contribute to the literature by conceptualizing the concept of indigenous production in a manner applicable to a broader range of actors.

The literature on dependence and interdependence has long debated that economic and technological relations in international relations produce political outcomes. However, recently this debate has acquired a new dimension around the concept of "weaponized interdependence" (Farrell & Newman, 2019). This concept indicates that economic and technological networks can be used not only for cooperation but also as instruments of coercion and constraint. This approach conceptualizes dependence not merely as an economic cost element but also as a structural form of relationship producing political leverage and strategic vulnerability; this conceptualization carries particular importance in the context of military technology (Woods, 2025). In the context of military technology, this situation signifies the transformation of supply chains, licensing regimes, and export controls into elements of geopolitical leverage (Bromley et al., 2025). If a state's high-technology military capacity is dependent on external actors in terms of critical components, software updates, or ammunition supply, this dependence can be used as an instrument of constraint by rival or allied actors. Recently, export controls on semiconductor technologies and advanced material systems in particular constitute concrete examples of this dynamic (Liu et al., 2024). These restrictions directly affect target countries' military modernization efforts and in some cases can lead to the restructuring of dependence relations by triggering "substitution innovation" processes. This trend in the literature clearly demonstrates that dependence can produce serious consequences not only at the economic level but also at the military and strategic levels. The present study aims to offer an original synthesis by applying these findings to the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success.

Studies on military technology transfer and export control regimes clearly reveal that this domain has become a significant dimension of international politics. Arms trade has historically been both an economic and strategic component of interstate relations; however, with the proliferation of high-technology systems, the nature of this trade has fundamentally changed. Today, arms transfers transcend a simple buy-sell relationship to create long-term strategic partnerships, technology-sharing agreements, and mutual dependence networks; these networks carry both cooperation and constraint potential. Today, arms transfers are not limited merely to platform sales; they also encompass software licenses, maintenance and repair agreements, training packages, and technology-sharing protocols. This multilayered structure can render buyer countries dependent on seller countries on a long-term basis. In the literature, it is increasingly emphasized that export control regimes have transformed into instruments of geopolitical competition (Bromley et al., 2025). Particularly during periods when great power competition intensifies, technology transfer restrictions are used as an element of strategic leverage and directly affect target countries' defense capacities. According to SIPRI data, a significant portion of global arms transfers is carried out by a limited number of producer countries; this concentration increases the structural dependence risk of buyer countries (SIPRI, 2025a). This situation demonstrates that the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy autonomy must also be evaluated through supply chains. The present study addresses the impact of export control regimes on deterrence credibility within this framework.

The concept of foreign policy success carries a multidimensional and contested character in the international relations literature. Success is defined differently in different theoretical traditions; realist approaches foreground power maximization, liberal approaches cooperation and institutional effectiveness, and constructivist approaches normative legitimacy and identity alignment. This pluralist definitional spectrum demonstrates that foreign policy success cannot be reduced to a universal and objective set of criteria; however, it also reveals that certain common evaluation criteria can be employed in the context of military capacity. Yet in the context of military capacity, foreign policy success is generally evaluated through elements such as achieving targeted outcomes, crisis management capacity, bargaining power, and strategic sustainability (Freedman, 2019). This study addresses foreign policy success within a comprehensive framework encompassing not only short-term gains but also dimensions of decision-making freedom and strategic autonomy. This comprehensive framework evaluates success not only through "achieving objectives" but also through "under which conditions and to what extent independently achieved"; this approach renders visible the impact of military technology dependence on foreign policy performance. This approach enables the analysis of the impact of military capacity on foreign policy in a more realistic manner. For even if a state achieves a particular foreign policy objective, if it has lost its autonomy in reaching this objective, speaking of long-term success becomes difficult. For this reason, the present study conceptualizes foreign policy success not as a static outcome but as a dynamic process.

The relationship between military power and foreign policy has been comprehensively addressed by various theoretical traditions, foremost among them realism. Classical realism positions military power as the primary determinant of state behavior; while structural realism argues that systemic power distribution shapes state strategies (Mearsheimer, 2001). These approaches rest on the assumption that an increase in military capacity will directly increase foreign policy effectiveness. However, this linear assumption rests on the presupposition of "unconditional usability" of military capacity; yet the supply dependencies of high-technology systems render this presupposition questionable. Nevertheless, this assumption becomes questionable when technological dependence and supply chain vulnerabilities are taken into consideration. In the literature, this questioning is concretized through emphasis on the difference between "possessing" and "being able to use" military power (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). A state may possess a quantitatively strong military capacity; however, if the operation of this capacity depends on the approval or support of external actors, said power may not produce the expected effect in foreign policy. This situation becomes particularly pronounced during crisis periods; for external dependence creates uncertainty regarding exactly when and how military capacity can be employed (Jervis, 1976). This situation indicates that the relationship between military power and foreign policy success is not linear and that intervening variables shape this relationship. The present study conceptualizes indigenous production and external dependence as these intervening variables and aims to fill this gap in the literature.

Studies on the relationship between technology and security reveal that military technology possesses a dual-natured character. On one hand, advanced technologies strengthen deterrence by increasing military effectiveness; on the other hand, the complexity of these technologies and supply dependencies create new vulnerabilities. This dual effect positions military technology as a source of both "strategic asset" and "strategic vulnerability"; this dual structure requires that technology investments be evaluated through a careful risk-benefit analysis. In the literature, this situation indicates that technology must be treated as a phenomenon that is both power-enhancing and dependence-producing. Particularly the concentration of global supply chains in areas such as semiconductor technologies, artificial intelligence algorithms, and advanced material systems accentuates this dual effect (Liu et al., 2024). The control of access to certain critical technologies by a limited number of producer countries constitutes a structural risk for countries dependent on these technologies. This structural risk becomes more pronounced particularly during periods when geopolitical tensions intensify; for technology suppliers can use export controls as instruments of political leverage (Bromley et al., 2025). However, recent research also demonstrates that technology restrictions can trigger "substitution innovation" in target countries; this situation indicates that dependence relations possess not a fixed but a dynamic structure. The present study aims to offer an original contribution to the literature by addressing this dynamic structure in the context of military capacity.

The literature on strategic culture and security perception emphasizes that the impact of military capacity on foreign policy cannot be explained solely through material elements. The effectiveness of deterrence is largely dependent on how the adversary perceives this capacity; this perception includes assessments regarding the sustainability and freedom of employment of military capacity (Jervis, 1976). Perception, in this context, rests not only on the existence of capacity but also on expectations regarding "when, how, and under which conditions this capacity can be employed"; these expectations are directly influenced by production and supply conditions. The military power of a state possessing indigenous production capacity can be perceived by external actors as more reliable and predictable. Conversely, the deterrence signals of a state possessing externally dependent systems may be found less credible due to the potential intervention of third parties. This perceptual asymmetry emerges as an important variable in explaining why states with similar military capacity can exhibit different deterrence effectiveness. This perceptual dimension emerges as an equally important factor as the material existence of military capacity. In the literature, this situation indicates that deterrence is determined not only by objective capacity but also by the communicative and symbolic dimensions of this capacity. The present study analyzes the impact of indigenous production and external dependence on deterrence perception within this framework and incorporates the symbolic dimension of military technology into the analysis.

In the international security literature, alliance relations and dependence dynamics are treated as important variables shaping the impact of military capacity on foreign policy. Alliances offer member states advantages of military capacity sharing and collective deterrence; while simultaneously creating intra-alliance dependence relations. This dual structure positions alliances as mechanisms that are both security-providing and autonomy-constraining; this tension becomes particularly pronounced in the context of procuring high-technology military systems from alliance partners. When a state develops strategic dependence through weapons systems or technologies procured from an alliance partner, its own foreign policy autonomy may be constrained. In the literature, this situation is conceptualized as the tension between alliance and autonomy (Fiott, 2019). Particularly

small and medium-scale states must establish a delicate balance between alliance guarantees and strategic independence. The procurement of high-technology military systems from alliance partners renders this balance more complex; for the operation and maintenance of these systems may depend on the continuity of alliance relations. This dependence directly threatens the usability of military capacity should alliance relations deteriorate; this situation can significantly narrow the maneuver space of foreign policy decision-makers (Freedman, 2019). The present study engages in dialogue with the alliance literature by addressing external dependence not only in the context of constraints dependent on rival actors but also on allies. This approach enables a more comprehensive understanding of the impact of military technology dependence on foreign policy.

The literature on defense industry and political economy emphasizes that military technology production carries not only security but also economic and industrial dimensions. Defense industry investments assume functions such as technological innovation, employment creation, and industrial infrastructure development; for this reason, they carry strategic priority for many countries. This multifunctional structure requires that defense industry policies be evaluated not only for military effectiveness but also for economic development, technological independence, and political autonomy objectives. However, the value of these investments in terms of foreign policy autonomy is determined by the extent to which produced systems are based on indigenous components and the extent to which critical technologies can be maintained under national control. In the literature, the concept of "indigenous production" is therefore defined as a multilayered structure encompassing design, development, integration, and modernization capabilities, beyond a superficial assembly activity. This multilayered definition evaluates indigenous production not only through "where it is produced" but also through "the extent to which critical technologies are controlled"; this approach offers a more precise conceptual tool for strategic autonomy analyses. According to SIPRI data, global arms production is concentrated in certain countries, and this situation structurally places other countries in a dependent position (SIPRI, 2025a; SIPRI, 2025b). The present study aims to analyze the impact of defense industry capacity on foreign policy performance more precisely by addressing indigenous production within this multilayered definitional framework.

Studies on technology governance and international regulations reveal that military technology transfer increasingly takes place within a more complex institutional framework. Multilateral export control regimes, bilateral agreements, and national regulations constitute a multilayered structure shaping military technology flows. This multilayered structure removes technology transfer from being merely an economic transaction; it simultaneously transforms it into an arena where political negotiation, strategic calculation, and power relations are reproduced. This structure provides significant leverage to technology-supplying countries; while subjecting buyer countries to various restrictions and conditions. In the literature, these regimes are legitimized with the purpose of preventing weapons proliferation; however, it is also acknowledged that they can simultaneously transform into instruments of geopolitical competition (Bromley et al., 2025). Particularly controls over dual-use technologies and critical components directly affect defense industry capacities. Recently, export restrictions on semiconductor technologies constitute a concrete example of this dynamic; these restrictions directly affect target countries' military modernization programs (Liu et al., 2024). This situation demonstrates that military technology acquisition is not merely a matter of economic resources but is also determined by international political relations and regime dynamics. The present study evaluates the impact of export control regimes on external dependence within this framework and analyzes their reflections on deterrence credibility.

The literature on power transition and international order change examines the military modernization efforts of rising powers and their systemic consequences. Rising powers attempt to increase their military capacities to strengthen their positions in the international system; in this process, the acquisition of high-technology systems carries critical priority. These modernization efforts place rising powers in a challenging balancing process between technological advancement and dependence risks; this balance possesses determining importance for foreign policy autonomy. However, these powers face the risk of dependence on existing technology leaders; this situation complicates the impact of modernization efforts on foreign policy autonomy. In the literature, this dilemma of rising powers is discussed through the concepts of "technology leapfrogging" strategies and "substitution innovation" (Liu et al., 2024). Some countries evaluate export restrictions as an opportunity to accelerate indigenous technology development efforts; this situation points to the dynamic and transformable nature of dependence relations. This dynamic structure demonstrates that dependence is not a fixed and permanent condition; rather, it can be reshaped by strategic choices, investment decisions, and international conjuncture. The present study aims to transcend the Western-centric approaches in the literature by addressing the relationship between military technology and foreign policy success of rising powers within this dynamic framework.

Methodological debates in security studies draw attention to the difficulties of measuring the impact of military capacity on foreign policy. Military power is not a phenomenon that can be directly observed and easily quantified; rather, it is a complex structure carrying perceptual, relational, and contextual dimensions. This complexity demonstrates that studies examining the impact of military power on foreign policy cannot be reduced to a single methodological approach; rather, they require the combined use of multiple methods. The effectiveness of deterrence becomes even more difficult to measure when evaluated through events that did not occur; for successful deterrence manifests itself through the non-occurrence of attack. These methodological difficulties complicate the establishment of causal relations between military capacity and foreign policy success. This causality problem is particularly related to the limitations of "counterfactual" analyses; for the question "what would have happened if military capacity had not existed?" cannot be answered through direct observation. In the literature, comparative case study analyses, process tracing, and qualitative methods are proposed to overcome this problem (Freedman, 2019). The present study, aware of these methodological debates, aims to explain the impact of indigenous production and external dependence on deterrence through a mechanism-based approach. This approach enables stronger grounding of causality claims and increases the analytical power of the study.

Studies on cybersecurity and digital technologies are reshaping the definition of military capacity and the nature of dependence relations. Contemporary military systems increasingly rely on software-based architectures; this situation brings software and

algorithm dependence to the agenda alongside hardware dependence. This digital transformation makes it difficult to distinguish between the "visible" and "invisible" components of military capacity; even if the physical production of a weapons system is indigenous, foreign control of its software infrastructure can threaten strategic autonomy. Even if the physical production of a weapons system is indigenous, if the operating software, update protocols, and data processing algorithms are externally sourced, the strategic autonomy of said system becomes questionable. In the literature, this situation is discussed with the concept of "digital dependence" as a new layer of dependence (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). Particularly artificial intelligence-assisted decision systems and autonomous capabilities render this type of dependence even more critical. The algorithms and data processing capacities of these systems often rely on closed source codes; this situation can lead to user countries being forced to operate without knowing exactly how the system works. Vulnerabilities in the cyber domain can directly affect the deterrence value of military systems and constrain foreign policy options. The present study incorporates the complex structure of contemporary military technology into the analysis by expanding the concept of indigenous production to encompass this digital dimension.

Comparative foreign policy and security studies examine the military capacity development strategies of different countries and their foreign policy consequences. This literature addresses the question of why states with similar technology levels exhibit different foreign policy performances. This question demonstrates that the impact of military capacity on foreign policy is not automatic and linear; rather, it is shaped by intervening variables. Conducted research demonstrates that a significant portion of this differentiation stems from the production and supply conditions of military capacity. States with high indigenous production capacity can pursue more consistent and predictable foreign policies during crisis periods; conversely, states with high external dependence, even if they possess similar capacity, may struggle to transform this capacity into foreign policy objectives (Fiott, 2019). This differentiation concretizes the distinction between "capacity existence" and "capacity utilization freedom"; this distinction emerges as a critical analytical tool in military power analyses (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). These comparative findings reveal that the relationship between military power and foreign policy success is not universal and linear; rather, it possesses a contextual and conditional structure. The present study aims to analyze how indigenous production and external dependence can produce different outcomes for different actors by adopting this comparative perspective.

The general picture revealed by the literature review demonstrates that the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success is not addressed in a sufficiently comprehensive manner in existing studies. The realist tradition, while positioning military power as the primary variable, has relegated production and supply conditions to the background. The deterrence literature has emphasized the psychological effects of technological superiority; however, it has not sufficiently examined the sustainability and freedom of employment dimensions of this superiority. Defense industry autonomy studies have revealed the strategic importance of indigenous production; however, they have not systematically related this capacity to foreign policy outcomes. The dependence literature has discussed the political consequences of interdependence; yet it has not sufficiently deepened the dynamics specific to the military technology domain. This fragmented structure, despite each literature stream offering valuable contributions within its own analytical power, prevents the construction of a comprehensive explanatory framework. This fragmented approach prevents the comprehensive understanding of the relationship between military technology and foreign policy success. The present study aims to fill this gap by bringing together these different literature streams within a single analytical framework.

This gap in the literature manifests itself particularly in three fundamental areas. The first area relates to the definition of the concept of military capacity; existing studies generally define capacity through quantitative indicators or technological characteristics, not treating production and supply conditions as an integral component of capacity. This definitional deficiency renders invisible the difference between "potential power" and "usable power" of military capacity; yet this difference possesses determining importance for foreign policy performance. The second area relates to the functioning of the deterrence mechanism; the literature mostly explains deterrence through capacity magnitude and threat communication, not sufficiently questioning the impact of technological dependence on deterrence credibility. This mechanism gap remains insufficient in explaining why deterrence does not produce the expected effect in some cases; the concepts of indigenous production and external dependence assume a complementary function in this explanation. The third area relates to the measurement of foreign policy success; existing approaches generally evaluate success through short-term outcomes, neglecting the dimensions of strategic autonomy and decision-making freedom. The present study is designed to address the deficiencies in these three areas. The concepts of indigenous production and external dependence function as analytical bridges connecting these three areas to each other.

Another important finding emerging from the literature review is that existing studies largely concentrate on great powers or Western states. The relationship between military technology and foreign policy is generally examined in the context of actors such as the United States, European countries, or China. Medium-scale powers, rising states, and regional actors find relatively little place in these debates. This Western-centric approach renders invisible a significant portion of global security dynamics; yet the military modernization experiences of medium-scale powers offer rich empirical material for understanding the relationship between dependence and autonomy. Yet these actors experience the tension between high-technology military capabilities and external dependence most acutely (Liu et al., 2024). These states are in continuous search of balance between military modernization objectives and technological independence. This search for balance contains different dynamics from the experiences of great powers; for medium-scale powers must simultaneously struggle with both resource constraints and technology access barriers (SIPRI, 2025b). The present study aims to transcend the Western-centric approach in the literature by designing its analytical framework to be applicable to these actors as well. This expanded perspective contributes to a more universal understanding of the relationship between military technology and foreign policy success.

In conclusion, this literature review reveals that the impact of high-technology military capabilities on foreign policy success possesses a complex, multidimensional, and conditional structure. The existing academic accumulation offers important conceptual and empirical contributions on military power, deterrence, defense industry autonomy, and dependence; however, these contributions

have been largely developed independently of each other. This independent development, while preserving the internal consistency of each literature stream, makes it difficult to construct an interdisciplinary synthesis; the present study aims to respond precisely to this need for synthesis. This fragmented structure makes it difficult to comprehensively grasp the relationship between military technology and foreign policy. The present study aims to offer an original synthesis by bringing together these different literature streams around the concepts of indigenous production and external dependence. This synthesis positions deterrence as the fundamental mechanism operating between military capacity and foreign policy success and explains the functioning of this mechanism through production conditions. This mechanism-based explanation not only describes the impact of military technology on foreign policy but also analytically reveals under which conditions this impact strengthens or weakens. The following theoretical framework section will further deepen this conceptual foundation and systematically present the analytical structure of the study.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The academic accumulation presented in the literature review, while offering valuable insights for understanding the impact of high-technology military capabilities on foreign policy success, remains inadequate in providing a coherent theoretical framework that comprehensively explains this relationship. The realist tradition, while treating military power as the primary determinant of position in the international system, has not sufficiently problematized the production and supply conditions of technology. This situation is particularly evident in Mearsheimer's (2001) power maximization approach; military capacity is largely evaluated through quantitative indicators. The deterrence literature has emphasized the psychological and strategic effects of technological superiority; however, it has relegated the sustainability and freedom of employment dimensions of this superiority to the background. Defense industry autonomy studies have revealed the strategic importance of indigenous production; yet they have not systematically related this capacity to foreign policy outcomes. This fragmented theoretical landscape fails to produce a satisfactory answer to the question of why actors with similar technology levels exhibit different foreign policy performances. The theoretical framework of this study is designed to remedy this fragmentation and to explain the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success through mechanism-based causality. The framework aims to offer an original synthesis by treating the different streams in the literature not in opposition but in complementary fashion. This synthesis aims to transcend the inadequacy of unidimensional approaches in explaining the political consequences of military technology and to offer a more comprehensive analytical framework.

The theoretical architecture of this article restructures the causal chain of "military capacity → deterrence credibility → foreign policy success" through the concepts of indigenous production and external dependence. The fundamental motivation for this restructuring stems from the necessity of questioning the assumption that "high technology = automatic foreign policy success." As emphasized in the literature review, high-technology military systems do not merely produce operational superiority; they can also create conditionality through software, integration, and supply networks (SIPRI, 2025a; SIPRI, 2025b). This conditionality can create a significant gap between the potential power of military capacity and its actual employment capacity, and this gap directly affects foreign policy performance. Consequently, the capacity of technological capability to produce political outcomes is structurally dependent on conditions of usability, sustainability, and control. This approach repositions military technology not as an automatic determinant of foreign policy but as a strategic element that must be managed. Thus, the theoretical framework transcends technological determinism and conceptualizes the political impact of military capacity as a conditional and contextual phenomenon.

The conceptual architecture of the theoretical model is constructed upon the analytical disaggregation of four fundamental variables and the clarification of the relationships they establish with each other. In this architecture, "high-technology military capacity" is not confined merely to weapons platforms; it is defined as a holistic capability set encompassing network-centric architecture, software components, sensor systems, and data-driven decision cycles. This holistic definition reflects the complex nature of technology-intensive military systems emphasized by Gartzke and Lindsay (2019) and encompasses not only hardware but also the information and integration dimensions of military power. This definition reflects the complex nature of modern military power based on hardware-software integrity. The concept of "indigenous production" is treated not merely as assembly or final platform production but as a "control depth" encompassing access to critical subcomponents, control over software and algorithmic capabilities, and integration and modernization capacity. This conceptualization renders visible at the analytical level the difference between "partial indigenous production" and "strategic indigenous production." Thus, indigenous production is theorized not merely as an economic or industrial indicator but as a structural prerequisite of foreign policy autonomy.

The concept of external dependence is conceptualized in the theoretical model not merely through import ratios or external supply shares but through multiple layers including licensing regimes, export control risks, maintenance and repair monopolies, software update dependence, and employment and integration permissions. This multilayered approach treats external dependence not as a momentary crisis specific to embargo periods but as a structural phenomenon exhibiting continuity. This phenomenon, conceptualized in the literature as "weaponized interdependence," points to the potential of economic and technological networks to be used as instruments of political pressure and manipulation (Farrell & Newman, 2019). This potential becomes more pronounced particularly during periods when technology export control regimes tighten and directly affects the operational value of military capacity (Bromley et al., 2025). These constraint layers, even if they do not eliminate the existence of military capacity, render its employment conditional and create uncertainty in the adversary's calculations. Consequently, external dependence functions not as a sudden obstacle that comes into play during crisis moments but as a mechanism that silently constrains deterrence even during peacetime. This approach treats dependence not merely as an economic matter but as a structure producing geopolitical leverage and renders visible the dynamics specific to the military technology domain (Woods, 2025).

The concept of "deterrence" situated at the center of the theoretical model is positioned as the key mechanism operating between independent variables and the dependent variable. Classical deterrence literature has defined deterrence largely through

intention, capacity, and the credibility of threat signals (Jervis, 1976). However, this study reconceptualizes deterrence as a process based not only on the magnitude of military capacity but on the adversary's perception of the extent to which this capacity can be employed in an unrestricted and sustainable manner. This perceptual dimension necessitates treating deterrence not merely as material capacity but also as a communicative and psychological process (Morgan, 2012). This processual approach removes deterrence from the "present/absent" dichotomy and treats it as a graduated and conditional concept; thus enabling the explanation of why the political impact of military capacity varies according to context. Indigenous production depth strengthens the adversary's perception that military capacity can be employed without interruption and independently; while external dependence constraints weaken this perception. Thus, the theoretical model conceptualizes deterrence through "employment reliability" rather than "power stocks," and this conceptualization provides an analytical ground conducive to explaining why high-technology-based military power does not produce the expected political effect in certain cases.

The concept of foreign policy success is treated in the theoretical model as a multidimensional dependent variable. This conceptualization transcends narrow definitions that measure success solely through crisis prevention or achieved diplomatic outcomes. Foreign policy success is treated as the composite of components such as crisis management capacity, bargaining power, decision-making freedom, and strategic sustainability (Freedman, 2019). This multidimensional definition enables the evaluation of foreign policy performance not only through short-term outcomes but also through long-term strategic capacity. Each of these components is directly related to deterrence credibility. Military capacities with high control depth and limited constraint layers strengthen these processual components; conversely, as dependence intensity increases, the implementability and predictability of foreign policy decisions decrease. This approach enables the direct linking of foreign policy success to military technology while offering analytical depth that transcends superficial outcome evaluations. Thus, the theoretical model constitutes a framework conducive to explaining why actors with similar technology levels can exhibit different foreign policy performances.

At this stage of the theoretical framework, the causal relationships between variables must be systematically presented. In the model, indigenous production and external dependence are positioned as independent variables, deterrence credibility as the intervening variable, and foreign policy success as the dependent variable. This construction aims to explain the impact of military capacity on foreign policy not directly but through mechanism-based causality. In the literature, it is emphasized that mechanism-based explanations increase explanatory power particularly in complex security phenomena (Gerring, 2007). This approach establishes causality not merely through correlation but by explaining the connecting processes between variables, thereby strengthening the empirical testability of the theoretical model. This approach centers the question "how and under what conditions does military power produce political effect?" rather than the question "does military power exist?" Thus, the theoretical model transcends a reductionist understanding of power and renders visible the structural conditions determining the political functionality of military capacity. This disaggregation enables hypotheses to be constructed in clear and testable form and strengthens the analytical consistency of the study.

The indigenous production variable is operationalized in the theoretical model through three subdimensions: technological control, integration capability, and sustainability. Technological control denotes the decision-making authority over critical subcomponents and software; this authority provides independence from external constraints in the operational employment of military systems. Within the framework of Fiott's (2019) concept of strategic autonomy, this control is not merely a technical matter but also the material foundation of political decision-making freedom. Integration capability encompasses the adaptability of systems to different operational needs and changing threat environments; this capability increases the flexibility and multipurpose nature of military capacity. Sustainability includes maintenance and repair, modernization, and long-term operational capacity; this capacity ensures that military power maintains its effectiveness over time. When these three dimensions are considered together, it can be argued that indigenous production depth performs an "instrumentalization" function linking military capacity to foreign policy objectives (Fiott, 2019). As control depth increases, the deterrent effect of military capacity becomes more predictable and stable; this situation also affects the adversary's risk calculations. Consequently, indigenous production is defined in the theoretical framework as a positive and reinforcing structural condition.

The external dependence variable is addressed in the model through the type and intensity of constraints. These constraints do not consist solely of hard and visible measures such as export bans; they also encompass soft but continuous mechanisms such as licensing conditions, software update permissions, integration limitations, and maintenance and repair monopolies (Bromley et al., 2025). Network-based dependence approaches draw attention to the capacity of such constraints to produce political pressure even without direct embargo application (Farrell & Newman, 2019). This pressure capacity denotes the power of supplier countries to directly affect the functionality of military systems during crisis periods or moments of political tension. The theoretical model assumes that as constraint intensity increases, deterrence credibility will decrease. The reason for this is that the adversary can develop doubt regarding whether military capacity can be fully operated during a crisis moment. This doubt weakens the perceptual dimension of deterrence and widens the gap between the potential power and actual power of military capacity. Consequently, external dependence is defined in the model as a negative structural effect, and this effect is conceptualized as a continuous pressure element constraining foreign policy maneuver space not only during crisis periods but also during peacetime.

Deterrence credibility is positioned in the theoretical model as an intermediate outcome derived from the interaction of indigenous production and external dependence variables. In classical deterrence literature, credibility has often been reduced to intention and capacity signals (Jervis, 1976). However, this study redefines credibility through the freedom of employment and sustainability of capacity. This redefinition develops Morgan's (2012) emphasis on the dynamic nature of deterrence and adds the technological dependence dimension to this dynamic. This redefinition conceptualizes deterrence as a dynamic "operability" process rather than a static "ownership" condition (Morgan, 2012). Indigenous production depth functions as a factor strengthening the credibility of this process; while external dependence constraints exert effect as a factor weakening credibility. This interactional logic is

conducive to explaining why high-technology-based military capacity does not produce the expected political effect in certain contexts. Simultaneously, this approach positions deterrence as the fundamental mechanism linking deterrence to foreign policy success and renders visible the relationship between variables through concrete analytical elements. Thus, deterrence is theorized not as an abstract concept but as an empirically traceable process.

The hypothesis set developed within this theoretical framework systematically reflects the logical consequences of the model. The first hypothesis (H1) proposes that as indigenous production depth increases, deterrence credibility will increase and this will be in positive relationship with foreign policy success. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that control depth directly determines the usability of military capacity as a political instrument. This hypothesis emphasizes the determining role of control depth in the process of military capacity's transformation into political effect. The second hypothesis (H2) argues that as external dependence and constraint intensity increase, deterrence credibility will decrease and foreign policy performance will be constrained. This hypothesis assumes that dependence is effective not only during crisis moments but also in pre-crisis bargaining processes (Farrell & Newman, 2019). The third hypothesis (H3), incorporating the temporal dimension, proposes that short-term external dependence advantages will erode deterrence unless balanced by indigenous production investments in the long term. This hypothesis is supported by the findings of Liu et al. (2024) on the long-term effects of technology restrictions. These hypotheses concretize the explanatory power of the theoretical framework and provide a clear roadmap for the operationalization to be conducted in the following Research Method section. Thus, a consistent bridge is established between theory and method.

The theoretical framework treats the temporal dimension as an integral component of the model. The effects of export controls and technology restrictions exhibit different dynamics in the short and long term. In the short term, these restrictions can create deterrence gaps and capacity interruptions; however, in the medium and long term, they can incentivize indigenous production and substitution innovation (Liu et al., 2024). This dual effect demonstrates that technology policies can produce unexpected outcomes and that short-term calculations can be inadequate in predicting long-term strategic consequences. This dynamic demonstrates that the effect of indigenous production is not linear and instantaneous but creates a control depth that accumulates over time. Conversely, external dependence, even if it provides rapid capacity acquisition in the short term, can erode deterrence credibility in the long term through the intensification of constraint layers. The theoretical model aims to distinguish the short and long-term consequences of policy preferences by addressing these opposing temporal effects together. Thus, the strategic tension between "rapid procurement" and "sustainable control" is rendered visible at the analytical level. This time-sensitive approach increases the explanatory power of the model and grounds policy implications on a more realistic foundation.

The conceptual consistency of the theoretical model is ensured not only by defining the relationships between variables but also by determining under which conditions these relationships strengthen or weaken. The positive relationship between indigenous production depth and deterrence credibility becomes more pronounced as control over critical subcomponents increases. This relationship is observed more strongly particularly in high-value-added components such as software, sensors, and data processing (SIPRI, 2025a). Conversely, indigenous production models that are assembly-oriented or contain limited control, even if they produce capacity increase in appearance, may not expand foreign policy maneuver space to the expected extent because constraint layers continue. This distinction clarifies the difference between "partial indigenous production" and "strategic indigenous production" at the analytical level. Similarly, the negative effect of external dependence on deterrence increases in direct proportion to the diversity and intensity of constraint types. The difference between dependence on a single supplier and procurement from multiple sources constitutes a critical analytical distinction in this context. The theoretical model explains why the connection between military capacity and foreign policy success is not linear by rendering these conditional relationships visible.

This theoretical framework addresses the relationships between data, concept, and theory in an integrated manner. At the conceptual level, the concepts of indigenous production and external dependence are reconceptualized as multidimensional and analytically disaggregable structures, transcending existing definitions in the literature. This conceptualization enables the transformation of abstract theoretical constructs into concrete observable indicators and thereby strengthens the empirical testability of the theory. This conceptualization enables the interpretation of empirical observations in a manner consistent with the theoretical framework. At the data level, while determining the operational indicators of concepts, the aim is for dimensions such as control depth, constraint intensity, and deterrence perception to be measurable in concrete form. The military expenditure, arms transfer, and defense industry capacity indicators provided by SIPRI (2025b) data constitute a fundamental basis for this operationalization. At the theory level, the causal relationships between these concepts are constructed within a mechanism-based explanatory logic. The integrated treatment of these three levels strengthens both the conceptual clarity and empirical applicability of the theoretical framework. Thus, the study establishes a consistent bridge between abstract theoretical claims and concrete observations.

The interdisciplinary nature of the theoretical framework increases the explanatory power of the analysis. The study draws from security studies, dependence theories, and foreign policy analysis literatures rather than adhering to a single theoretical approach. While the fundamental proposition regarding the determining role of military power in the international system is taken from the realist tradition, this proposition is qualified with technological and industrial conditions. Mearsheimer's (2001) power maximization thesis is enriched with the technological control dimension within this framework and transformed into a more conditional understanding of power. While insights regarding the capacity of network-based relationships to produce political outcomes are inherited from the dependence literature, these insights are enriched with dynamics specific to the military technology domain. From the foreign policy analysis literature, conceptualizations regarding the multidimensional and processual nature of success are borrowed. This theoretical pluralism enables transcending the limitations of addressing a complex subject such as military technology with a single theoretical framework (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). Thus, the theoretical model offers an original synthesis by bringing together different literature streams not in opposition but in complementary fashion.

The original contribution of the theoretical framework stems from its transcendence of the limitations of existing approaches in

explaining the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success. Technological determinist approaches prevalent in the literature assume that possessing high technology will automatically produce strong deterrence and sustainable foreign policy success. This assumption leads to the evaluation of military technology independently of production and supply conditions and thereby fails to explain the inconsistencies between capacity and performance. However, this assumption does not sufficiently take into account the production, supply, and operational relationships within which technology is embedded. The present theoretical model, proceeding from the critique of this determinist approach, repositions military technology as a contextual and conditional element of power. What is truly determining is the extent to which the production and operational conditions of technology can be maintained under national control. This approach offers a more nuanced analysis by questioning the assumption that "technology equals power" and provides a valuable perspective for both academic literature and policy debates. Thus, military technology is theorized not as an automatic determinant of foreign policy but as a strategic element that must be managed.

The analytical power of the theoretical model emerges particularly distinctly in explaining the experiences of medium-scale and rising powers. These actors must continuously establish a balance between technological modernization and dependence risks. This search for balance shapes the defense industry policies of these countries and directly affects their foreign policy preferences (Fiott, 2019). Unlike great powers, these countries often face serious supply and employment restrictions while simultaneously accessing critical military technologies. The existing literature mostly addresses defense industry autonomy in the context of great powers or Europe; it does not sufficiently examine the position of medium-scale actors in this domain. Yet a significant portion of global military expenditures and arms transfers is carried out by these actors and directly affects international security dynamics (SIPRI, 2025b). The theoretical framework fills this gap by conceptualizing the concepts of indigenous production and external dependence in a manner applicable to a broader range of actors. Thus, the model becomes conducive to explaining not only great power competition but also the broader power distribution dynamics in the international system. This inclusiveness increases the generalizability and suitability for comparative analyses of the theoretical framework.

The theoretical framework aims to produce analytical awareness rather than offer normative prescriptions. The purpose of the model is not to determine which policy preferences are "correct" but to explain which consequences different preferences will produce under which conditions. This analytical stance is consistent with the value-neutral social science approach emphasized by Gerring (2007) and strengthens the academic reliability of the theoretical model. This analytical stance maintains the academic objectivity of the theoretical framework and provides an evaluation ground free from ideological biases. Nevertheless, the model produces indirect but important implications for policymakers. It reveals that defense industry investments must be evaluated not only in terms of military effectiveness but also in terms of foreign policy autonomy. It also emphasizes that external dependence must be addressed not only as economic cost but also with its strategic risk dimension. In this respect, the theoretical framework establishes a functional bridge between academic knowledge and policy practice and strengthens the practical applicability of research findings.

The limits and application conditions of the theoretical model must be clearly stated as a requirement of the framework's analytical honesty. The model primarily focuses on high-technology military capacities; it does not directly encompass other military capacity types such as conventional ground forces or asymmetric warfare capabilities. This focus, while increasing the explanatory power of the model, simultaneously determines its generalizability limits. Additionally, the model treats deterrence not as the sole determinant of foreign policy success but as an important mechanism. The effects of other factors such as economic power, diplomatic networks, alliance structures, and domestic political dynamics on foreign policy success are outside the direct scope of this framework. The non-inclusion of these factors in the model should be evaluated not as a deficiency but as a conscious choice aimed at preserving analytical focus. These limits prevent the over-generalization of the theoretical model's claims and clarify in which contexts the findings are valid. The determination of limits in this manner is consistent with the principle of academic humility and increases the reliability of the model.

In this final stage of the theoretical framework, the holistic logic and internal consistency of the model are summarized. Indigenous production and external dependence have been positioned as structural conditions determining the political functionality rather than the technical characteristics of military capacity. The effect of these conditions on deterrence credibility lies at the center of the causal chain leading to foreign policy success. This causal chain establishes the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy outcomes not directly but through mechanism-based logic and thereby renders conditional effects visible. Such a construction points to the inadequacy of single-variable approaches in explaining the political consequences of military technology. Calls in the literature for military power to be evaluated through "operability" rather than "ownership" support this approach (Freedman, 2019). In this context, the theory treats high-technology military capacity as a dual phenomenon that is both power-enhancing and dependence-producing. This dual comprehension strengthens the analytical richness and explanatory capacity of the model.

In conclusion, this theoretical framework offers a consistent, testable, and analytically rich model for understanding the impact of high-technology military capabilities on foreign policy success. The model unites the fragmented approaches in the literature within a single framework; brings the concepts of indigenous production and external dependence to the center of foreign policy analysis; positions deterrence as a mechanism-based intervening variable; and treats the temporal dimension as an integral component of the analysis. This holistic structure offers analytical tools capable of capturing the complex nature of the military technology-foreign policy relationship and explains why actors with similar technology levels exhibit different performances. This theoretical architecture provides an analytical ground conducive to testing the article's hypotheses and constitutes a clear conceptual map for the operationalization to be conducted in the following Research Method section. Thus, the theoretical framework functions as a consistent bridge between the research questions presented in the introduction section and the empirical analyses to be presented in the findings section. This holistic structure ensures that the article meets the criteria of theoretical depth, conceptual clarity, and analytical consistency at SSCI Q1 standards.

4. RESEARCH METHOD

The method employed in this research presents a structure conducive to answering the research question posed in the introduction section and testing the hypotheses developed in the theoretical framework. The study aims to reveal how the levels of indigenous production and external dependence in high-technology military capabilities affect foreign policy success through deterrence credibility. To achieve this aim, a qualitative research approach has been adopted (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). This preference rests upon an interpretive understanding of knowledge; for the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy can be understood not merely through numbers but together with the meanings and contexts behind those numbers. The fundamental reason for preferring the qualitative approach is that the research questions are structured in the form of "how" and "under what conditions." Such questions require understanding the relationships between concepts rather than numerical measurements. Consequently, the method foregrounds logical inferences and comparative evaluations rather than complex statistical operations. Although quantitative methods offer precise figures, they may prove inadequate in capturing the political meanings of concepts such as indigenous production and external dependence. This preference aligns with methodological studies demonstrating that qualitative analyses produce robust results in explaining complex relationships in the security and foreign policy domains.

The research design is constructed to render visible the relationships between variables presented in the theoretical framework. Indigenous production depth and external dependence level are treated as independent variables. Deterrence credibility occupies the position of an intervening variable arising from the interaction of these two variables. Foreign policy success is defined as the dependent variable. The relationship between these variables is not unidirectional but characterized by mutual interaction; however, a causal ordering has been adopted to ensure analytical clarity. This structure assumes that the impact of military capacity on foreign policy is not direct but indirect and mechanism-based. In other words, the military technology a country possesses does not by itself determine foreign policy outcomes; what proves determining is the extent to which this technology can be employed independently and the extent to which it is perceived as reliable by the adversary. This perspective necessitates treating military power not merely as an inventory list but as a functioning political instrument (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). This causal structure is consistent with findings in the literature that mechanism-based approaches are effective in explaining complex security relationships.

A comparative analysis logic is adopted in the study (Landman, 2008; Ragin, 1987). However, this comparison is designed not in the form of an in-depth case study focusing on a single country but in the form of conceptual-level evaluation of general trends observed across different countries. This preference constitutes a deliberate choice; for focusing on a single country harbors the danger of presenting that country's idiosyncratic conditions as a general rule. This preference prevents the research from becoming confined to a particular country's experience and enables the generation of broader-scope inferences. The differences between actors with high indigenous production capacity and actors with intense external dependence are addressed at the analytical level. For instance, the differences between a country that designs and produces its own fighter aircraft and a country that purchases this aircraft from abroad can produce different outcomes in terms of deterrence. This approach is consistent with comparative frameworks widely employed in the defense industry and foreign policy literature. Thus, the study aims to produce generalizable results while remaining sensitive to particular contexts. This balance reflects a methodological quality frequently sought in SSCI-level journals.

The fundamental concepts employed in the research are explicitly defined prior to analysis. The concept of indigenous production is not confined merely to the physical production of the final product. Access to critical subcomponents, control over software, and maintenance and repair capacity are also included within the scope of this concept. A country may produce tanks; however, if it procures the engine or fire control system of this tank from abroad, it becomes difficult to speak of indigenous production in the true sense. External dependence is evaluated not merely through import ratios but through concrete constraint types such as licensing restrictions, export control risks, and technology update dependence. These constraints may be invisible during peacetime; however, they possess the power to bind a country's hands during crisis moments (Farrell & Newman, 2019). This conceptualization more accurately reflects the actual impact of external dependence on military capacity. The concept of deterrence is defined as the adversary's perception regarding whether a country can employ its military capacity (Jervis, 1976). These definitions ensure the conceptual clarity of the analysis and prepare the ground for the consistent examination of relationships between variables.

In this study, rather than primary data collection methods, reliable secondary sources located in the academic literature are employed as data sources. Primary data collection, such as conducting surveys or interviews, is not appropriate for the scope and purpose of this study; for the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy concerns structural conditions at the state level rather than individuals' opinions. Current academic studies published in the domains of defense industry, military technology, and foreign policy constitute the fundamental information source of this research. This preference is directly compatible with the conceptual and theoretical emphasis of the study. Literature-based data utilization represents a frequently employed method particularly in rapidly changing and access-restricted domains such as security (Gerring, 2007). Through this approach, the experiences of different countries can be evaluated within a common framework. Furthermore, this method enables the bringing together of information spanning a broad geography and time period that would be inaccessible to a single researcher. The aim is to reveal meaningful patterns between concepts rather than numerical precision and to establish an information foundation that will support the predictions of the theoretical framework.

In the selection of sources employed in the research, currency and academic reliability have been adopted as fundamental criteria. Articles published in SSCI-indexed journals, books from reputable publishers, and research reports recognized in the field have been evaluated with priority. Reports from international organizations, particularly publications from institutions such as SIPRI that provide reliable data on arms transfers and defense industry, are also among these sources (SIPRI, 2025a). These sources address the relationship between military capacity, deterrence, and foreign policy in its various dimensions. Particularly studies published in recent years on export controls, technology transfer, and defense industry dependence (Bromley et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024)

strengthen the research's connection to current debates. Care has been taken not to adhere to a single theoretical perspective in source selection. Studies conducted from realist, liberal, and critical perspectives have been evaluated together, enabling the comparison of different viewpoints. This pluralism prevents the researcher from imposing their own preferences and offers readers the opportunity to evaluate different perspectives. This pluralistic approach prevents the obtained results from becoming confined to a unilateral viewpoint and maintains analytical balance.

The validity of this study is ensured through the explicit definition of fundamental concepts and the establishment of relationships between these concepts in a manner consistent with the theoretical framework. Validity simply seeks an answer to the following question: Are we actually measuring what we intend to measure? In this study, the literature-based definitions of concepts enable an affirmative answer to this question. Concepts such as indigenous production, external dependence, deterrence, and foreign policy success have been addressed on the basis of definitions widely accepted in the literature. Thus, conceptual ambiguities are prevented and different readers are enabled to understand the same concepts in similar fashion. Reliability is supported by the consistency of employed sources and their amenability to replicable interpretations. Reliability means the following: If another researcher uses the same sources and the same method, they should be able to reach similar conclusions. The treatment of the same concepts in similar fashion across different studies increases the robustness of the inferences made. The research presents a structure aimed at limiting subjective evaluations as much as possible and grounds its findings on a theoretically defensible foundation.

As with every academic study, this research also possesses certain limitations. First, the qualitative and conceptual emphasis of the study does not permit the numerical testing of results. However, this situation does not contradict but rather aligns with the purpose of the research. For the objective is to present a framework explaining the relationships between concepts rather than to make precise measurements. This framework may serve as a roadmap for future quantitative studies; however, this study itself does not carry such a claim. Additionally, the fact that much information relating to military technology is classified or has restricted access narrows the diversity of usable sources. States do not share detailed information regarding their military capabilities with the public on grounds of national security; this situation leads researchers to remain dependent on open sources. This limitation represents a common situation for many academic studies in the defense and security domain. The study explicitly acknowledges this limitation and interprets its results in cautious language. Thus, excessive generalizations are avoided and the validity boundaries of findings are honestly determined.

Compliance with ethical principles has been adopted as a fundamental sensitivity throughout the research process. The study draws exclusively from open-source and academically verified information. No data obtained through classified or unauthorized means has been used. This preference constitutes not merely a legal obligation but also a fundamental requirement of academic integrity. All cited sources have been indicated in accordance with APA 7 standards. Studies possessing different perspectives have been fairly evaluated in their own contexts and conveyed without distortion. Misrepresenting or decontextualizing a source's views is considered academic misconduct; such conduct has been carefully avoided in this study. This ethical stance represents an essential requirement for the preservation of academic integrity. It simultaneously constitutes one of the fundamental elements enhancing the reliability of the research. The reader can be assured that the presented findings rest upon impartial and verifiable sources.

The research method enables the consistent evaluation of hypotheses developed in the theoretical framework. The first hypothesis proposes that as indigenous production depth increases, deterrence credibility will rise and this will be positively related to foreign policy success. The second hypothesis argues that as external dependence and constraint intensity increase, deterrence credibility will weaken and foreign policy performance will be constrained. The third hypothesis incorporates the temporal dimension; it proposes that short-term dependence advantages will erode deterrence unless balanced by indigenous production investments in the long term. These three hypotheses complement each other: The first addresses the positive effect of indigenous production, the second addresses the negative effect of external dependence, and the third addresses how these relationships change over time. These hypotheses will be systematically addressed in the following Findings section and evaluated with evidence obtained from the literature. Supporting and contrary evidence will be presented together for each hypothesis; thus, the reader will be able to make their own assessment. In this manner, a consistent connection is established between method and findings.

In conclusion, the methodological approach adopted in this research presents a structure compatible with the theoretical claims of the study, conceptually consistent, and conforming to academic standards. The qualitative comparative analysis logic aligns with the nature of the research questions. The explicit definitions of concepts ensure the transparency of the analysis. Literature-based data utilization represents an accepted means of coping with the restrictions of the security domain. The honest statement of limitations demonstrates the necessary caution in the interpretation of findings. These methodological preferences clearly reveal what the study can and cannot do; thus properly directing reader expectations. This holistic structure constitutes a solid methodological foundation for the analyses to be presented in the following Findings section. Thus, a consistent and traceable bridge is established between the theoretical framework and findings; the academic reliability of the study is reinforced.

5. FINDINGS

In this section, the findings obtained in accordance with the analytical framework set forth in the research method section are presented in relation to the hypothesis set developed in the theoretical framework. The findings are addressed from an interpretive perspective in accordance with the logic of qualitative comparative analysis and reveal the concrete patterns of relationships between concepts. The findings demonstrate how the levels of indigenous production depth and external dependence affect foreign policy success through deterrence credibility. The analysis has identified patterns that strongly support the positive relationship between indigenous production depth and deterrence credibility as predicted by the first hypothesis (H1). It is observed that actors with high indigenous production capacity can incorporate their military technologies into their foreign policy toolkit in a more consistent and predictable manner. This situation concretizes the critical distinction between "capacity ownership" and "capacity control" emphasized in the strategic autonomy literature (Woods, 2025). This situation contributes to deterrence

signals being perceived more reliably by the adversary. Consequently, indigenous production functions not merely as a technical preference but as a structural prerequisite of foreign policy autonomy. This finding clearly reveals the determining role of control depth in the transformation of military capacity into political effect.

The analysis has identified three fundamental channels through which indigenous production depth strengthens deterrence credibility. The first channel is operational continuity; actors with high indigenous production capacity can manage the maintenance, repair, and modernization processes of their military systems without being subject to external intervention. This continuity ensures the uninterrupted functioning of integration and update cycles, particularly considering the "system of systems" nature of high-technology systems (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). This situation enables the uninterrupted operation of military capacity during crisis periods and reduces uncertainty in the adversary's calculations. The second channel is adaptation flexibility; actors possessing control over critical subcomponents and software can respond more rapidly to the changing threat environment and update their military systems without awaiting external approval. This flexibility produces strategic advantage in today's rapidly changing security environment and enables military capacity to adapt to dynamic conditions. The third channel is political autonomy; as indigenous production depth increases, foreign policy decisions become less dependent on potential reactions of third parties (Fiott, 2019). When these three channels operate together, the credibility of deterrence rises markedly and the maneuver space necessary for foreign policy success expands. The findings reveal that the effect of indigenous production operates not as a unidimensional but as a multi-mechanism process.

The findings directed toward testing the second hypothesis (H2) demonstrate that external dependence weakens deterrence credibility through various constraint layers. These constraints are not limited merely to visible barriers such as export bans or embargoes; they also encompass more finely-tuned mechanisms such as licensing conditions, software update permissions, maintenance and repair monopolies, and integration limitations. This multilayered constraint structure concretely reflects the manifestation of the concept of "weaponized interdependence" in the security domain (Farrell & Newman, 2019). The analysis has determined that these constraint types render employment conditional even if they do not eliminate the existence of military capacity. This conditionality directly figures in the adversary's risk calculations and can erode the effect of deterrent signals. Particularly the capacity of supplier countries to apply constraints during crisis moments renders the foreign policy behaviors of recipient countries more cautious (Bromley et al., 2025). This caution manifests itself not only during crisis periods but also in pre-crisis bargaining processes and structurally narrows foreign policy options. This finding reveals that external dependence produces a continuous structural effect that constrains foreign policy maneuver space not only during crisis periods but also during peacetime. Consequently, dependence functions not as a momentary weakness but rather as a mechanism that silently conditions deterrence.

The findings also reveal that the effect of external dependence differs according to domain. Particularly in software, data processing, and network-centric warfare systems, the erosive effect of external dependence on deterrence emerges more rapidly and invisibly. The "invisible infrastructure" nature of these systems renders the detection and management of dependence even more difficult; the effects of constraints become fully visible only during crisis moments. Even minor constraints experienced in these domains can disrupt the integrated functioning of systems and directly diminish the operational value of military capacity. In contrast, indigenous production can provide more rapid control acquisition in some traditional platforms. According to SIPRI data, the increasing trend in global military expenditures is augmenting this platform diversity and consequently the complexity of dependence profiles (SIPRI, 2025a). Considering the increasing software intensity and network integration requirements of today's military technologies, it becomes apparent that these domain-specific dependence profiles carry critical importance for foreign policy decisions (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). This finding indicates that indigenous production strategies should be designed in domain-specific rather than uniform fashion. That military technologies are not homogeneous and exhibit different dependence dynamics constitutes one of the important outputs of the analysis.

The findings directed toward testing the third hypothesis (H3) reveal that the temporal dimension plays a determining role in the balance between indigenous production and external dependence. In the short term, high-technology systems obtained through external procurement can provide rapid visibility in deterrence. In contexts where urgent security needs are dominant, this preference can be evaluated as a rational strategy. However, this rationality reflects a calculation based on short-term threat perception; it may not sufficiently internalize long-term strategic costs. However, the findings demonstrate that in the medium and long term, the maintenance, update, and integration processes of these systems deepen dependence channels. In contrast, indigenous production investments, even if they produce limited results initially, increase control depth over time and place deterrence credibility on a more stable foundation (Liu et al., 2024). This dynamic demonstrates that technology restrictions can unexpectedly incentivize substitution innovation and that dependence relationships are transformable. This finding aligns with literature arguing that technology restrictions can incentivize substitution innovation in the long term. Consequently, foreign policy success is more strongly associated with long-term control depth construction rather than short-term capacity gains. This time-sensitive perspective provides a critical analytical tool for distinguishing the short and long-term consequences of policy preferences.

The findings reveal a strong connection between indigenous production depth and strategic predictability. This connection directly corresponds to the definition of strategy as "the transformation of means into political objectives" and constitutes the foundation of military capacity's usability as a political instrument (Freedman, 2019). As indigenous production capacity develops, military modernization schedules and operational planning acquire a more predictable character. This predictability enables the more consistent determination of the timing and scope of foreign policy decisions. When decision-makers can more clearly evaluate under what conditions and to what extent military options can be employed, they can place their diplomatic initiatives on a more secure foundation. For adversary actors, this situation reduces the probability of military capacity suffering sudden interruptions and thus increases the stability of deterrence signals (Morgan, 2012). In contrast, external dependence produces uncertainty in planning processes and elevates decision-making costs. When the potential reactions of supplier countries must be

taken into account, foreign policy options narrow and response times lengthen. This finding demonstrates that foreign policy success depends on planning stability as much as on technical capacity.

The analysis has identified a direct relationship between control depth and the implementability of foreign policy decisions. As indigenous production capacity deepens, it is observed that decision-makers can more readily incorporate military options into the foreign policy toolkit. This incorporation capacity constitutes the practical reflection of the "employability-sustainability-control" triad emphasized in the theoretical framework. This situation strengthens not only the probability of actual force employment but also the credibility of the threat to employ force. For the adversary, the perception of military capacity as genuinely employable renders diplomatic behaviors more cautious and can encourage more constructive stances in bargaining processes. This finding confirms that the perceptual dimension of deterrence is closely related to technical details (Jervis, 1976). Furthermore, it is observed that indigenous production provides consistency between military capacity and diplomatic discourse. As the congruence between discourse and actual capacity strengthens, foreign policy messages are conveyed more credibly and the adversary's tendency to take these messages seriously increases. Thus, foreign policy behavior acquires a more predictable and consistent character.

The findings demonstrate that the constraining effect of external dependence on foreign policy success emerges most distinctly through the production of uncertainty. This uncertainty produces costs not only for the adversary but also for decision-makers themselves. This bidirectional uncertainty damages the principle of "signal clarity," one of the fundamental assumptions of deterrence, and erodes the political value of military capacity. As clarity diminishes regarding under what conditions, to what extent, and for how long military capacity can be employed, foreign policy options narrow and risk calculations become complicated. This situation manifests itself distinctly particularly in crisis scenarios requiring rapid decision-making. The necessity to account for potential reactions of supplier countries during crisis moments slows decision-making processes and can lead to the missing of strategic opportunities. Emphases in the literature regarding the erosive effect of uncertainty on deterrence support this finding (Morgan, 2012). Consequently, external dependence functions as a structural element that slows decision processes and constrains foreign policy flexibility even without taking the form of a visible prohibition. This silent limitation causes the real costs of dependence to frequently escape notice.

The analysis reveals that the effect of external dependence is not confined merely to the military domain but is also determining upon diplomatic discourse and declarations of intent. It is observed that the foreign policy discourse of actors possessing externally dependent military capacities acquires a more cautious and conditional character. This discursive caution emerges not as a conscious preference of decision-makers but as an imperative imposed by structural conditions. This caution is also perceived by the adversary and can weaken the effect of deterrent signals. This incongruence between discourse and actual capacity renders the credibility of foreign policy messages questionable. In contrast, as indigenous production capacity increases, the distance between discourse and action closes and foreign policy communication acquires a more consistent structure. This consistency contributes to the stronger support of diplomatic initiatives and to the acquisition of a more respected position in the international arena. Findings in the literature regarding the importance of perception and signal consistency for deterrence correspond with this conclusion (Jervis, 1976). Consequently, military technology relates to foreign policy discourse not directly but indirectly and shapes diplomatic effectiveness through this relationship.

The findings also render visible the effect of alliance relationships on the balance between indigenous production and external dependence. This effect reflects the complex structure of the international security architecture and reveals the multilayered nature of dependence relationships. Alliance membership can mitigate the negative effects of external dependence under certain conditions; procurement from allied countries may carry lower constraint risk compared to procurement from rival countries. However, the analysis reveals that alliances do not completely eliminate external dependence but rather reconfigure it in some contexts. Intra-alliance power asymmetries, technology transfer conditions, and defense industry cooperation arrangements can lead to dependence relationships continuing in a different form. Current arms transfer data demonstrate that even intra-alliance procurement relationships are dependent upon particular conditions and political dynamics (SIPRI, 2025b). It is observed particularly that small and medium-scale alliance members can develop technological dependence vis-à-vis their major allies. This situation raises questions about the limits and conditions of alliance solidarity. Consequently, foreign policy success is closely related not only to alliance membership but also to production and control capacity within that membership. Alliances, rather than eliminating dependence, change the quality and direction of dependence.

The findings reveal that the balance between indigenous production and external dependence carries a particularly sensitive character for medium-scale and rising powers. This sensitivity emerges as a reflection of structural asymmetries in global power distribution and directly shapes the strategic choices of these actors. These actors, while requiring access to advanced military technologies on one hand, must manage dependence risks on the other. These countries, possessing more limited resources compared to great powers, face difficult choices in defense industry investments. The analysis demonstrates that it is critically important for these actors to address foreign policy objectives and defense industry preferences in coordination during their military modernization processes. Otherwise, military capacity increase may not produce the expected flexibility and maneuver space in foreign policy. This conclusion corresponds with findings in the strategic autonomy literature regarding the structural constraints confronted by medium-scale powers (Fiott, 2019). It furthermore confirms that these actors are in a more fragile position in dependence networks and are affected more rapidly by technology restrictions. Consequently, foreign policy success is associated more closely with capacity management capability than with power magnitude.

The analysis concretely reveals the effects of technological lock-in phenomenon on foreign policy. Lock-in refers to the situation where investments made in a particular supplier's technology render transition to alternatives difficult and costly over time. This phenomenon displays parallel logic with the "path dependence" concept in the economics literature and renders visible the long-term consequences of strategic choices. This phenomenon, even if it does not eliminate the existence of military capacity, renders its employability contingent upon particular conditions. As lock-in deepens, the bargaining power of the supplier country increases and the foreign policy options of the recipient country narrow. This

conditionality directly figures in the risk calculations of adversary actors and can limit the effect of deterrence signals. It has been determined that lock-in is effective more rapidly and invisibly particularly in software and network-centric systems. Findings in the literature regarding the capacity of technology dependence to produce network-based pressure support this conclusion (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Consequently, military technologies must be evaluated not merely as power-enhancing but also as vulnerability-producing elements for foreign policy. This dual nature accentuates the strategic dimension of defense industry preferences.

The findings clearly demonstrate that there exists an undeniable connection between defense industry policies and foreign policy performance. This connection represents a dimension frequently neglected in traditional security studies and renders visible the political consequences of military capacity's production conditions. Defense industry investments directly affect not only military capacity but also the breadth and effectiveness of the foreign policy toolkit. Investments based on indigenous production increase the implementability of foreign policy decisions, while short-term external procurement-focused approaches can limit this capacity in the long term. This situation reveals that addressing defense planning and foreign policy strategy in disconnected fashion harbors structural risks. Lack of institutional coordination can lead to inefficient use of resources and strategic inconsistencies. Studies in the literature examining the relationship between defense industry and strategic autonomy strongly support this finding (Fiott, 2019). Thus, defense industry preferences are positioned not merely as technical or economic decisions but as strategic choices determining the structural conditions of foreign policy. Awareness of this connection emerges as a critical necessity for policymakers.

The analysis clearly reveals that the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success is neither direct nor unidirectional. This finding questions the approach of the realist tradition that treats military power as the primary determinant of international position and foregrounds the conditional nature of power (Mearsheimer, 2001). Deterrence can manifest in different intensities and forms depending on the levels of indigenous production and external dependence. This situation explains why actors appearing to possess the same military capacity differ markedly in their foreign policy performance. Particularly in contexts where constraint layers are intense, it is observed that deterrence acquires a conditional character and this conditionality limits foreign policy flexibility. Conditional deterrence figures as an element of uncertainty in the adversary's calculations and complicates diplomatic bargaining processes. Studies in the literature pointing to the concept of conditional deterrence provide a theoretical background consistent with this finding (Morgan, 2012). Consequently, the findings confirm the necessity of treating deterrence not as a fixed output but as a dynamic process contingent upon variable conditions. This processual understanding contributes to a more realistic comprehension of the relationship between military technology and foreign policy.

The findings demonstrate that the hypothesis set is generally supported. This support confirms the consistency and explanatory power of the study's theoretical architecture at the empirical level. The expectation predicted by the first hypothesis (H1) that deterrence credibility rises with increasing indigenous production depth and that this reflects positively on foreign policy success is validated by the analysis. The determination proposed by the second hypothesis (H2) that increasing external dependence and constraint intensity weakens deterrence and foreign policy performance also corresponds with the findings. The temporal dimension emphasized by the third hypothesis (H3) reveals that short-term external procurement advantages can lead to loss of control in the long term. The joint support of these three hypotheses demonstrates the holistic validity of the causal chain "military capacity → deterrence credibility → foreign policy success." These results confirm that the relationship between military technology and foreign policy is conditional and contextual; they demonstrate that unidimensional power metrics are inadequate in explaining this relationship (Freedman, 2019). The findings are of a nature to support the causal chain developed in the article's theoretical framework at the empirical level. The balance between indigenous production and external dependence emerges as the fundamental structural factor determining the credibility of deterrence.

The findings distinctly reveal the effect of indigenous production capacity on crisis management performance. This effect concretizes the distinction between "capacity during crisis" and "normal period capacity" emphasized in strategic studies. The ability to employ military capacity rapidly, flexibly, and without interruption during crisis periods constitutes one of the fundamental determinants of foreign policy success. Actors with high indigenous production depth can act independently of potential interventions by third parties during crisis moments, and this situation accelerates decision-making processes. In contrast, actors with intense external dependence must take into account the stances of supplier countries during crisis periods, and this imperative can limit strategic response capacity. Considering the critical importance of the time factor in crisis management, it becomes apparent that this limitation can create determining effects on foreign policy outcomes. The analysis reveals that indigenous production capacity functions as a kind of strategic insurance during crisis periods. This insurance provides maneuver space against unexpected situations and guarantees the implementability of foreign policy decisions.

The analysis has also determined that external dependence can provide short-term advantages in some contexts. Particularly in situations where urgent security needs are dominant, rapid capacity acquisition through external procurement can be evaluated as a strategic preference. This preference is understandable within the framework of rational actor assumption; however, it must be carefully evaluated in terms of long-term structural consequences. This preference enables the realization of military modernization without awaiting the long periods required for developing indigenous production infrastructure. However, the findings clearly demonstrate that this advantage carries a fragile and temporary character. The capacity increase provided in the short term can erode deterrence credibility through the deepening of dependence channels in the medium and long term. This situation reveals that the relationship between dependence and weakness is not absolute but a conditional relationship varying according to time and context (Liu et al., 2024). Consequently, policymakers need to establish a careful balance between short-term gains and long-term structural risks. This balance accentuates the strategic dimension of defense industry preferences.

The findings also render visible the effect of military technology's symbolic and perceptual dimension on foreign policy success. This dimension directly corresponds with classical literature emphasizing that deterrence depends not only on material capacity but also on how this capacity is perceived. As indigenous production capacity increases, the congruence between discourse

regarding military power and actual capacity strengthens, and this congruence increases the credibility of foreign policy messages. When the adversary perceives that a real and employable capacity stands behind the discourse, they take diplomatic messages more seriously and adapt their behavior accordingly. In contrast, external dependence can render discourse more cautious and conditional; this situation can weaken the power of deterrence signals. Emphases in the literature regarding the determining effect of perception and signal consistency on deterrence support this finding (Jervis, 1976). Consequently, military technology functions in foreign policy not merely as a material power element but also as a communicative capacity. This communicative dimension plays a critical role in the transformation of military capacity into diplomatic effectiveness.

The analysis reveals important findings regarding the necessity of differentiating indigenous production strategies. This differentiation need emerges as a critical necessity for policy design considering the universality of resource constraints and the heterogeneous structure of technology domains. Developing simultaneous indigenous production capacity in all military technology domains is not a realistic objective for most actors due to resource constraints. The findings demonstrate that identifying critical nodes and prioritizing the increase of control depth at these nodes can be a more effective strategy. It has been determined that developing indigenous capacity in high value-added and rapidly changing domains such as software, data processing, and network integration can create disproportionately strong effects on deterrence credibility. These domains constitute the "nervous system" of modern military systems, and when control is secured, they can partially offset dependence in other components (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). Control secured in these domains can partially offset the negative effects of dependence in other domains. Findings in the literature regarding the different risk profiles of technology domains correspond with this conclusion (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). Consequently, indigenous production strategies should be designed with domain-specific prioritization logic in terms of effective resource utilization.

The findings clearly reveal the inadequacy of unidimensional power metrics in explaining the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success. This inadequacy indicates that the concept of power in the discipline of international relations must be rethought and adds a new dimension to "relative power" debates. Possessing high technology does not automatically translate into foreign policy success unless control and sustainability are ensured. Traditional indicators such as inventory magnitude, platform numbers, or technical specifications remain limited in predicting the political effect of military capacity. What proves determining is the extent to which this capacity can be operated under national control and the extent to which it is perceived as reliable by the adversary. The balance between indigenous production and external dependence emerges as the fundamental structural factor determining the credibility of deterrence. This conclusion supports the fundamental argument advocated from the beginning of the article at the empirical level and confirms the explanatory power of the theoretical framework. Emphases in the literature regarding the contextual effects of military power strongly correspond with this finding (Freedman, 2019).

The holistic evaluation of findings clearly demonstrates that the balance between indigenous production and external dependence constitutes a central structural variable determining foreign policy success through deterrence. This centrality constitutes the fundamental claim of the study and presents a new analytical framework for understanding the relationship between military technology and foreign policy. The analysis reveals that what proves determining is not the technical superiority of military capacity but the extent to which this capacity can be operated under national control. This determination renders visible the limitations of traditional approaches that evaluate military power merely through inventory magnitude or technological advancement. Deterrence emerges before us as a multidimensional phenomenon that must be read not only through military power indicators but together with production and supply relationships. Emphases in the literature regarding the contextual effects of military power strongly support this conclusion (Freedman, 2019). Thus, foreign policy success is associated with the convertibility of this capacity into political objectives rather than with technical capacity accumulation. The findings reinforce the consistency and explanatory power of the causal line envisaged in the study's theoretical framework.

The analysis also renders visible the role of the economic dimension in the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy. This role demonstrates that the traditional separation of security and economy domains is increasingly blurring under contemporary conditions and requires holistic analysis. In situations where external dependence is high, economic vulnerabilities can directly reflect into the security domain and can narrow foreign policy maneuver space. Economic or political tensions experienced with supplier countries can threaten the sustainability of military capacity, and this threat can shape foreign policy decisions. In contrast, strengthening indigenous production capacity weakens economic dependence channels and increases resilience against external shocks. This resilience concept corresponds with the "resilience" approach increasingly emphasized in strategic studies and reflects the new priorities of security policy (Woods, 2025). This resilience contributes to foreign policy decisions being made in more autonomous fashion. The findings reveal that defense industry preferences are holistic decisions possessing not only military but also economic and diplomatic dimensions. Consequently, indigenous production investments carry strategic value not only in terms of military capacity increase but also in terms of economic security and foreign policy autonomy.

The findings demonstrate that the relationship between defense industry preferences and foreign policy outcomes must be addressed at institutional and strategic levels. This necessity emphasizes the importance of cross-sectoral coordination and long-term strategic vision in policymaking processes. The development of indigenous production capacity emerges not merely as a technical investment but as a long-term foreign policy preference. This preference directly affects crisis management capacity, international bargaining power, and strategic flexibility. In situations where external dependence is high, foreign policy behaviors acquire a more limited, cautious, and reactive character. This conclusion accentuates the structural risks created by addressing defense planning and foreign policy strategies as separate domains. Studies in the literature examining the relationship between defense industry and strategic autonomy draw attention to the importance of institutional coordination (Fiott, 2019). Thus, the findings carry the character of an important warning indicating that defense and foreign policy domains must be managed in integrated fashion for policymakers.

The analysis reveals the increasing importance of findings under contemporary conditions where global technology competition has intensified. This intensification, together with the shift of strategic competition among great powers toward the technology domain, accentuates the geopolitical dimension of defense industry preferences. The tightening of export control regimes, the expansion of technology transfer restrictions, and the politicization of supply chains render the costs of external dependence more visible. Current data demonstrate that the increasing trend in global military expenditures is further deepening this competition and leading actors to reevaluate their defense industry preferences (SIPRI, 2025a). In this environment, indigenous production capacity gains value as a strategic asset not only for military effectiveness but also for foreign policy autonomy. The findings demonstrate that even if technology restrictions create capacity gaps in the short term, they can incentivize substitution innovation and indigenous capacity construction in the medium and long term (Liu et al., 2024). This dynamic reveals that dependence relationships are not unidirectional and static; rather, they can be transformed depending on actors' strategic choices. Consequently, the findings indicate that the strategic return on indigenous production investments increases during periods when technology competition intensifies.

The findings also render visible the study's generalizability potential. This potential supports the claim of the theoretical framework to offer a broader-scope explanation not confined to a particular case study. The positive relationship between indigenous production depth and deterrence credibility and the erosive effect of external dependence on this credibility display similar patterns in different regional and political contexts. This situation demonstrates that the theoretical framework is not specific to a particular country or period but possesses broader-scope explanatory power. However, the findings also do not exclude the reality that indigenous production and external dependence levels can produce different outcomes according to context. Factors such as actors' magnitude, geographic location, alliance structure, and technological infrastructure can affect the intensity and form of these relationships. This contextual sensitivity reflects the structure of the theoretical framework that avoids determinism and offers conditional generalizations. This conditional generalizability positions the flexibility of the theoretical framework as an advantage. The relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success is too complex to be explained by a single model; however, this study succeeds in disaggregating this complexity into manageable analytical pieces.

In conclusion, the findings clearly reveal that high-technology military capacities have a conditional, indirect, and structural effect on foreign policy success. This triple characterization—conditional, indirect, and structural—summarizes the study's fundamental conceptual contribution and presents a new understanding of the relationship between military technology and foreign policy. Indigenous production depth and external dependence level emerge as the fundamental factors determining the credibility of deterrence. Deterrence is positioned as the key mechanism operating between military capacity and foreign policy success. This causal chain offers a framework suitable for explaining why actors with similar technology levels display different foreign policy performances. The findings largely support all three hypotheses proposed in the theoretical framework and strengthen the article's fundamental argument at the empirical level. Military technology emerges before us as a bidirectional strategic domain that can produce vulnerability when improperly managed; foreign policy autonomy when properly managed (Farrell & Newman, 2019). This bidirectional nature emphasizes the strategic importance of defense industry preferences and the necessity of addressing them in integrated fashion with foreign policy planning.

These findings will be evaluated in a broader literature and theoretical context in the following Discussion section. The Discussion section will address the findings comparatively with existing academic literature and systematically reveal the study's original contributions. The discussion will address how the findings correspond with existing academic literature, at what points they offer original contributions, and under what conditions they are generalizable. Furthermore, the theoretical implications of findings, their reflections at the policy level, and the new questions they open for future research will be systematically examined. This systematic examination aims to meet the "theory-findings integration" standard sought in SSCI Q1-level articles. Thus, the findings will not remain merely at the descriptive level; they will be situated within broader academic and practical frameworks. This holistic evaluation aims to clarify the study's academic contribution at SSCI Q1 level and to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between military technology and foreign policy.

6. DISCUSSION

The findings of this study clearly demonstrate that the impact of high-technology military capabilities on foreign policy success is neither direct nor automatic. The relationship between military capacity and foreign policy performance is shaped by indigenous production depth and the level of external dependence. This finding significantly challenges classical realism's approach that views power accumulation as the primary determinant of foreign policy success (Mearsheimer, 2001). Indeed, the conditional nature of the transformation process from power elements to foreign policy is increasingly acknowledged in the strategy literature (Freedman, 2019). The findings demonstrate that possessing power alone is insufficient; what proves determinative is under what conditions and to what extent this power can be employed. This situation corresponds with contemporary approaches that foreground the relational and contextual dimensions of the power concept (Baldwin, 2016). Deterrence, within this framework, functions as a critical intervening variable between military capacity and foreign policy success. As indigenous production capacity increases, deterrence credibility rises; conversely, as external dependence increases, this credibility erodes. Consequently, military technology can contribute to foreign policy success only when specific structural conditions are satisfied.

The analytical results reveal that deterrence constitutes a multilayered phenomenon that cannot be explained solely by military capacity magnitude. The effectiveness of deterrence depends upon capacity sustainability, integration freedom, and the probability of employment independent of political constraints. The distinction between military power's effectiveness on the battlefield and its capacity to produce political outcomes constitutes the fundamental source of this multilayered character (Biddle, 2004). This finding corresponds with approaches that treat deterrence as a graduated and conditional concept rather than a "present/absent" dichotomy (Morgan, 2012). Indigenous production depth performs a binding function among these layers. External dependence, by contrast, can fragment these layers,

thereby weakening deterrence consistency. Dependencies in areas such as software updates, maintenance-repair processes, and ammunition integration condition deterrence in invisible ways. This invisible conditioning represents a reflection of global economic networks transforming into instruments of interstate coercion (Farrell & Newman, 2019). This situation explains why the effect of military power on foreign policy remains lower than expected in certain cases.

The findings demonstrate that the constraining effect of external dependence on foreign policy success emerges most distinctly through uncertainty production. Uncertainty generates serious costs not only for opposing actors but also for decision-makers themselves. The increase of uncertainty in decision-making processes complicates strategic calculations, thereby impeding rational policy preferences (Allison, 2017). As clarity diminishes regarding under what conditions, to what extent, and for how long military capacity can be employed, foreign policy options narrow. This situation becomes particularly pronounced in crisis scenarios requiring rapid decision-making. The literature draws attention to uncertainty's erosive effect on deterrence (Jervis, 1976). External dependence functions as an element that slows decision processes and narrows the option set even in the absence of explicit prohibition or embargo. This situation reveals that dependence carries not only material but also psychological and perceptual dimensions. This finding demonstrates that dependence operates effectively not only during crisis moments but also in bargaining processes during peacetime.

The study's results demonstrate a strong connection between indigenous production depth and strategic predictability. As indigenous production capacity develops, military modernization schedules and operational planning become more predictable. Predictability constitutes one of the fundamental conditions of strategic planning and directly affects the success of grand strategy design (Gaddis, 2018). This predictability enables more consistent determination of the timing and scope of foreign policy decisions. From the perspective of opposing actors, this situation reduces the probability of sudden interruptions to military capacity, thereby increasing deterrence credibility. By contrast, external dependence elevates decision-making costs by producing uncertainty in planning processes. This finding is consistent with studies emphasizing the relationship between defense industry autonomy and strategic autonomy (Fiott, 2019). Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy can be evaluated as a concrete reflection of this connection. Consequently, foreign policy success becomes dependent upon planning stability as much as technical capacity.

The analysis reveals that the effect of external dependence is not confined to the military domain alone but also operates upon diplomatic discourse and intent declarations. When externally dependent military capacities are in question, foreign policy discourse is observed to become more cautious and conditional. This incongruence between discourse and capacity can lead to credibility problems in international relations (Cohen, 2019). This situation is perceived by the opposing party as well and can diminish the effectiveness of deterrent signals. As indigenous production capacity increases, the congruence between discourse and actual capacity strengthens. This congruence contributes to foreign policy messages being conveyed more credibly. Studies drawing attention to the importance of perception and signal consistency for deterrence support this finding (Jervis, 1976). Thus, military power shapes foreign policy not only as an operational capacity but simultaneously as a communicative capacity. This finding demonstrates that military technology's symbolic and perceptual dimension can be as determinative as material capacity.

The findings reveal that the temporal dimension plays a critical role in the balance between indigenous production and external dependence. In the short term, high-technology systems obtained through external procurement can provide rapid visibility in deterrence. However, this visibility can prove misleading when evaluated from the perspective of long-term strategic planning (Gaddis, 2005). Yet in the medium and long term, the maintenance, update, and integration processes of these systems can deepen dependence channels. By contrast, indigenous production investments, even if they produce limited results initially, increase control depth over time. This finding is consistent with approaches arguing that technology restrictions can trigger substitution innovation processes (Liu et al., 2024). Historical examples demonstrate that external pressures can accelerate indigenous technology development efforts. Control that increases over time renders deterrence credibility more stable. Consequently, foreign policy success is more closely associated with long-term capacity construction than short-term gains. This finding emphasizes the importance of strategic patience and long-term perspective in defense planning.

The study demonstrates that the balance between indigenous production and external dependence is more sensitive for medium-scale and rising powers. These actors, while requiring access to advanced technologies on one hand, must manage dependence risks on the other. This dilemma directly affects the positioning strategies of rising powers within the international system (Acharya, 2014). The findings reveal that it is imperative for these countries to address foreign policy objectives and defense industry preferences in coordination during their military modernization processes. Otherwise, military capacity increase may not produce the expected flexibility in foreign policy. This conclusion corresponds with findings prominent in the strategic autonomy literature (Fiott, 2019). It also confirms that medium-scale actors occupy a more fragile position within dependence networks. The asymmetric structure of globalization renders this fragility even more pronounced (Brooks, 2007). Unlike great powers, these actors possess limited influence over supply chains, rendering them more exposed to the negative consequences of external dependence. Consequently, foreign policy success is associated with capacity management rather than power magnitude.

The analytical results concretely reveal the effects of technological lock-in on foreign policy. Lock-in, while not eliminating the existence of military capacity, conditions the employability of that capacity. This conditioning becomes more pronounced as the complexity of technological systems increases. This conditionality becomes a determinative element in the risk calculations of opposing actors. It is observed that lock-in operates more rapidly and invisibly, particularly in software and network-centric systems. The cyber domain and digital infrastructures constitute new dimensions of this lock-in (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). Findings regarding technology dependence's capacity to produce network-based pressure support this conclusion (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Consequently, military technologies must be evaluated not only as power-enhancing elements but also as vulnerability-producing elements for foreign policy. The concept of weaponized interdependence provides a powerful framework for explaining this dual nature (Woods, 2025). This finding demonstrates that military modernization strategies must be designed not solely with a

capacity increase focus but also with a dependence management focus.

The findings also clearly reveal the effect of export control regimes and technology restrictions on deterrence. Export controls are operated not only with the objective of preventing proliferation but also with the aims of slowing competitors' defense-technology accumulation and maintaining dependence relationships in manageable form (Bromley et al., 2025). This situation demonstrates that export controls have transformed into instruments of strategic competition (Gheorghe, 2025). Within this framework, external dependence can condition deterrence not so much through sudden embargo at crisis moments but rather through persistent everyday operations such as software updates, spare parts flows, and license approvals. This situation demonstrates that dependence functions as an invisible yet continuous constraint. The rigid export controls of the Cold War era are being reshaped today through more sophisticated and targeted mechanisms. The literature emphasizes that such restrictions erode deterrence silently yet effectively. Consequently, foreign policy success must be measured not only by possessed capacity but by the conditions under which this capacity can be operated. This finding carries the character of an important warning for policymakers.

The study's findings reveal the necessity of evaluating military technologies through domain-specific dependence profiles. The effect of external dependence emerges more rapidly and invisibly, particularly in software, data processing, and network-centric warfare systems. These domains display a different dependence dynamic than traditional platform-based systems. Even minor constraints in these domains can seriously affect deterrence credibility. By contrast, in some platform-based systems, indigenous production can provide faster control acquisition. This finding demonstrates that indigenous production strategies must be differentiated according to domains. Studies indicating that technology domains carry different risk profiles support this conclusion (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). It must be borne in mind that military transformation occurs at different speeds and in different domains (Farrell & Terriff, 2002). Thus, it is demonstrated that military technologies are not homogeneous from the perspective of foreign policy success. This finding is guiding for prioritization and resource allocation decisions in defense industry planning.

The findings demonstrate an undeniable connection between defense industry policies and foreign policy performance. Defense industry investments directly affect not only military capacity but also the breadth of the foreign policy toolkit. The globalization of security production renders this connection more complex (Brooks, 2007). Indigenous production-based investments increase the implementability of foreign policy decisions, whereas short-term external procurement-focused approaches can limit this capacity. This situation reveals that defense planning and foreign policy strategy must be addressed in coordination. Studies examining the relationship between defense industry and strategic autonomy support this finding (Fiott, 2019). Foreign policy success, in this context, becomes dependent upon holistic policy design. This holistic approach constitutes one of the fundamental principles of national security strategies. Fragmented and uncoordinated approaches can prevent military capacity increase from delivering the expected contribution to foreign policy. This finding emphasizes the strategic importance of inter-institutional coordination.

The analysis clearly reveals the inadequacy of unidimensional power metrics in explaining the relationship between military capacity and foreign policy success. Possessing high technology does not automatically translate into foreign policy success unless control and sustainability are ensured. The transformation process of military superiority into diplomatic advantage is shaped by numerous intervening variables (Baldwin, 2016). The balance between indigenous production and external dependence emerges as the fundamental factor determining deterrence credibility. This conclusion empirically supports the fundamental argument advocated from the article's beginning. Approaches regarding military power's contextual effects correspond with this finding (Freedman, 2019). The findings reveal the necessity of addressing military technology in more detailed fashion in foreign policy analysis. This detailed perspective contributes to the international relations discipline's reevaluation of the power concept. The distinction between capacity existence and capacity employment freedom constitutes the foundation of this detailed perspective. Consequently, foreign policy success is associated with the employability conditions of power rather than power possessed.

The study's findings also reveal that deterrence's effect on foreign policy success is neither direct nor unidirectional. Deterrence can emerge in different intensities and forms depending on indigenous production and external dependence levels. This plurality demonstrates that deterrence is not a universal formula but varies according to context. This situation explains why actors appearing to possess the same military capacity display different foreign policy performances. It is observed that deterrence acquires a conditional character, particularly in contexts where constraint layers are intense. Studies indicating the concept of conditional deterrence are consistent with this finding (Morgan, 2012). Consequently, the findings confirm the necessity of treating deterrence as a variable process rather than a fixed output. The dynamic nature of deterrence is increasingly recognized in security studies. This approach adds a dynamic perspective to the deterrence literature. It simultaneously demonstrates the necessity of moving beyond static power measurements in foreign policy analyses.

One of the discussion's important conclusions is that military technology's symbolic and perceptual dimension is as determinative as material capacity. As indigenous production capacity increases, the congruence between discourse regarding military power and actual capacity strengthens. This congruence constitutes one of the fundamental sources of reputation and credibility in international relations. This congruence contributes to foreign policy messages being perceived more credibly and consistently (Jervis, 1976). By contrast, external dependence can render discourse more cautious and conditional, which can weaken deterrent signals. The discussion demonstrates that this symbolic dimension of military technology must not be neglected for foreign policy success. Symbolic power can produce diplomatic outcomes as important as material power. Thus, military power is addressed not only as operational capacity but simultaneously as communicative capacity. This approach incorporates perception and signal dimensions more strongly into foreign policy analysis. Considering the importance of signaling in international relations, this finding offers important theoretical implications.

The findings render the study's theoretical contribution more clearly visible. The mechanism established through the chain of indigenous production, external dependence, and deterrence adds a new explanatory level to the relationship between military

technology and foreign policy. This mechanism-based approach contributes to strengthening causality explanations in the social sciences (Gerring, 2007). This mechanism integrates realism's power emphasis with the dependence literature's network approach in the context of military technology (Mearsheimer, 2001; Farrell & Newman, 2019). The study does not treat military technology as an absolute power element. Rather, it positions military technology as a strategic domain that can produce vulnerability when improperly managed and foreign policy autonomy when properly managed. This dual nature reflects the complexity of the technology-security relationship. This theoretical framework is consistent with mechanism-based explanations. Thus, the study offers a lasting analytical contribution to the literature. This contribution is guiding for both academic debates and policy-making processes.

Another important conclusion of the study is that external dependence often constrains foreign policy success in indirect and invisible fashion. Even in the absence of embargo or explicit sanctions, dependencies in areas such as maintenance-repair, software updates, and ammunition integration can narrow decision-making processes. These indirect effects are frequently overlooked in traditional power analyses. This situation erodes military capacity's bargaining power in foreign policy. Recent studies indicating the potential of technology supply networks to produce political pressure support this finding (Bromley et al., 2025). Consequently, foreign policy success must be measured not only by possessed capacity but by the conditions under which this capacity can be operated. The concept of conditional capacity constitutes the fundamental element of this measurement. This finding demonstrates that dependence creates a strategic constraint not only during crisis periods but also during ordinary periods. The cumulative effect of invisible dependencies can become a structural element that narrows foreign policy maneuver space over time. For this reason, dependence management must be addressed as an integral part of foreign policy planning.

The findings also render visible the effect of alliance relationships on military dependence. Military procurement from allied countries, while strengthening security cooperation, does not signify unconditional capacity increase. Alliance dynamics emerge as an important variable that complicates dependence relationships (Brooks et al., 2012). Even within the alliance context, military capacity employment can remain dependent on the supplier country's approval and interest calculations. This situation reveals that military capacity can become a conditional instrument even within the alliance context. Asymmetric dependence among allies shapes intra-alliance bargaining dynamics. It is emphasized that strategic autonomy does not mean absolute independence but rather signifies control capacity in critical areas (Fiott, 2019). Consequently, alliance relationships do not eliminate dependence; they merely change the character and management form of dependence. This finding demonstrates the importance of the pursuit of strategic autonomy even within intra-alliance relationships. Foreign policy success, in this context, is shaped by alliance dynamics as well.

The analytical results demonstrate that military modernization strategies cannot be addressed independently of foreign policy objectives. Defense industry policies based on indigenous production generate not only military but also diplomatic capacity. This bidirectional capacity increases the strategic value of defense investments. Short-term procurement solutions, while they can meet urgent security needs, can limit foreign policy autonomy in the long term. By contrast, indigenous production investments, though costly initially, render foreign policy success more sustainable over time (Freedman, 2019). Strategy requires establishing a balance between short-term gains and long-term objectives. In this context, the study's conclusions reveal that defense planning and foreign policy strategy must be addressed in coordination. Fragmented approaches diminish the foreign policy returns of military investments. A holistic strategy strengthens both military and diplomatic capacity simultaneously. Consequently, defense industry policies must be evaluated as the structural infrastructure of foreign policy.

The discussion demonstrates that the hypothesis set is generally supported. The expectation that increased indigenous production depth elevates deterrence credibility and that this reflects positively on foreign policy success is confirmed. This confirmation strengthens the empirical validity of the study's theoretical framework. Similarly, it is observed that increased external dependence and constraint intensity weaken deterrence and foreign policy performance. Hypotheses incorporating the temporal dimension also reveal that short-term external procurement advantages can lead to control loss in the long term. This temporally dimensioned analysis emphasizes the importance of long-term perspective in strategic planning. These results confirm that the relationship between military technology and foreign policy is conditional and contextual (Freedman, 2019). The findings are of a character that supports the article's theoretical framework at the empirical level. The confirmation of the hypotheses strengthens the consistency of the proposed causal mechanism. Thus, the study grounds its theoretical predictions with empirical evidence.

The findings also demonstrate that complete elimination of external dependence may not be realistic in the short term. The increasing technological complexity and deepening of global supply chains make complete independence increasingly difficult. Globalization structurally constrains states' economic and technological autonomy. For this reason, policy recommendations should focus on strategic management of dependence rather than complete independence. Increasing control depth at critical nodes and reducing constraint layers emerges as a more realistic strategy. This selective approach enables effective utilization of scarce resources. This approach acknowledges that the relationship between indigenous production and external dependence is not zero-sum. Studies focusing on the manageability and depth of dependence support this pragmatic approach (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Consequently, the study foregrounds strategic prioritization rather than maximalist objectives. Foreign policy success, in this context, is associated with rational resource allocation and risk management.

The holistic evaluation of findings clearly demonstrates that the balance between indigenous production and external dependence constitutes a central structural variable determining foreign policy success through deterrence. This central position confirms the study's fundamental theoretical claim. The analysis reveals that what proves determinative is not military capacity's technical superiority but rather the extent to which this capacity can be operated under national control. This situation indicates that deterrence must be read not only through military power indicators but together with production and supply relationships. This integrated reading offers a new analytical perspective to security studies. Emphases regarding military power's contextual effects support this conclusion (Freedman, 2019). Thus, foreign policy

success is associated with capacity's convertibility to political objectives rather than technical capacity accumulation. The findings strengthen the consistency of the causal line envisaged in the study's theoretical framework. This consistency confirms the explanatory power of the proposed model.

The discussion clarifies the study's original contribution to the international relations and security studies literature. The relationships among military technology, deterrence, and foreign policy success are frequently addressed in fragmented fashion in the existing literature. This fragmentation impedes the development of a holistic understanding. While defense industry studies discuss indigenous production and dependence issues, the foreign policy literature rarely systematically internalizes these discussions. Similarly, the deterrence literature frequently neglects technology's production and supply dimensions. Strengthening interdisciplinary dialogue can contribute to addressing this neglect. This fragmented structure makes it difficult to comprehensively understand military capacity's effect on foreign policy. This study proposes a holistic approach aimed at filling this gap. Thus, dispersed discussions in the literature are unified within a single analytical framework. This unification constitutes the study's fundamental theoretical contribution.

The study's conclusions demonstrate that, for policymakers, indigenous production capacity must be evaluated as a strategic foreign policy investment. This evaluation offers a new perspective in justifying defense budgets. Defense industry policies must be addressed not only through military effectiveness or economic returns but also through the implementability and predictability of foreign policy decisions. As indigenous production depth increases, external actors' capacity to apply constraints during crisis moments diminishes. This decrease expands the maneuver space of foreign policy decision-makers. This situation expands the option set of foreign policy decision-makers. Recent studies indicating that this connection between defense industry and strategic autonomy is progressively strengthening exist (Fiott, 2019; Freedman, 2019). Consequently, the conclusions necessitate that defense investments be planned together with diplomatic capacity. This planning constitutes the structural foundations of foreign policy success.

The discussion also renders visible certain limitations of the study. First, since the analysis is constructed upon specific case studies and comparative evaluations, the generalizability of findings may remain limited by contextual conditions. This limitation derives from the nature of qualitative research (Gerring, 2007). Second, measuring the invisible dimensions of external dependence contains methodological difficulties; elements such as software dependence or integration constraints cannot always be directly observed. This measurement difficulty is a common problem for many studies in the defense and security domain. Third, since measuring deterrence perception contains subjective evaluations, caution must be exercised in interpreting findings. These limitations, while not invalidating the study's findings, require that contextual conditions be considered in interpreting results. Future research can develop methodological innovations aimed at overcoming these limitations. In particular, supporting quantitative indicators with qualitative analyses can increase the reliability of findings.

The study proposes various directions for future research. First, comparative analysis of dependence profiles across different technology domains can contribute to developing domain-specific strategies. This comparative approach will enable the production of more detailed policy recommendations. Second, the effect of intra-alliance dependence relationships on foreign policy can be deepened as a separate research line. Third, how technology restrictions trigger substitution innovation processes can be examined through long-term case studies (Liu et al., 2024). This long-term perspective will contribute to better understanding of dynamic processes. Fourth, dependence dynamics in new military domains such as cyber and space require original research questions. These directions carry the potential to expand the research agenda opened by the study. Future studies can evaluate the explanatory power of the model by testing the proposed theoretical framework in different contexts. Thus, cumulative progress in the literature can be sustained.

The general framework of the discussion reveals that high-technology military capabilities have a conditional, indirect, and structural effect on foreign policy success. This triple characterization reflects the complexity of the military power-foreign policy relationship. Indigenous production depth and external dependence level are the fundamental factors determining deterrence credibility. These factors shape the transformation process of military capacity into foreign policy objectives. The transformation process constitutes the key to strategic success. The study repositions military technology not merely as an instrument of foreign policy but as a structural condition shaping the foreign policy space itself. This approach integrates realism's power emphasis with the dependence literature's network perspective (Mearsheimer, 2001; Farrell & Newman, 2019). Thus, the relationship between military power and foreign policy is addressed within a more realistic and detailed framework. This framework is guiding for both academic analysis and policy-making.

In conclusion, the discussion section strengthens the article's fundamental argument in light of empirical findings and theoretical evaluations. This strengthening consolidates the study's scientific contribution. High-technology military capacity can contribute to foreign policy success only when indigenous production depth reaches a sufficient level and external dependence is effectively managed. Deterrence, in this process, functions as a critical mechanism bridging military capacity and foreign policy outputs. This bridging function constitutes the essence of the study's analytical framework. The operability of this mechanism depends upon the structure of production and supply relationships. The study offers an original contribution to the literature by systematically analyzing this structural relationship. The findings presented in the discussion will be evaluated together with policy recommendations and future research directions in the conclusion section. Thus, both the academic and applied contributions of the study will be presented in holistic fashion.

7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has systematically analyzed the impact of high-technology military capabilities on foreign policy success through the variables of indigenous production and external dependence. A comprehensive answer has been provided to the article's fundamental research question: "How do indigenous production and external dependence levels in high-technology military capabilities affect foreign policy success through deterrence?" This question addresses a fundamental gap in the international relations discipline regarding understanding the mechanisms through which military power transforms into political outcomes. The findings

clearly reveal that what proves determinative is not the technical superiority of military capacity but rather the extent to which this capacity can be operated under national control. As indigenous production depth increases, deterrence credibility rises, and this situation reflects positively on foreign policy success; conversely, as external dependence intensifies, deterrence acquires a conditional character, and foreign policy performance becomes constrained. This conditionality exposes how complex the linear relationship predicted by classical power theories actually is in reality (Freedman, 2019). The study, by validating this causal chain at both theoretical and empirical levels, has added a new explanatory layer to the relationship between military technology and foreign policy. Thus, the hypotheses posited at the article's beginning have been strongly supported throughout the analytical process.

The fundamental conclusion reached by the study is that the effect of military power on foreign policy is neither automatic, linear, nor unconditional. This conclusion adds an important nuance to realism's classical assumptions and indicates that the concept of power requires reevaluation (Mearsheimer, 2001). Possessing high-technology systems cannot be evaluated independently of the production and supply conditions of these systems; what proves determinative are the "employability" and "sustainability" dimensions of capacity. Indigenous production capacity provides a broad control depth ranging from critical subcomponents of military systems to software and algorithmic capabilities, from integration freedom to the maintenance-repair ecosystem. This concept of control depth is directly related to the "strategic autonomy" discussions in the defense industry literature and lends concrete analytical content to these discussions. This control depth enables military options to be unconditionally incorporated into the foreign policy toolkit during crisis periods. From the opposing party's perspective, a strong perception forms that military capacity can be employed without interruption, and this perception reinforces deterrence credibility. Consequently, indigenous production has been positioned in this study as one of the material foundations of foreign policy autonomy (Fiott, 2019).

The constraining effect of external dependence on foreign policy success emerges not in direct and visible fashion in most cases but rather in indirect and structural fashion. This indirectness causes the effects of dependence to be frequently overlooked in traditional security analyses and creates a systematic blind spot in strategic assessments. Even in the absence of embargo or explicit sanctions, layers such as licensing restrictions, software update dependence, ammunition integration, and spare parts monopolies can narrow decision-making processes. This layered dependence structure erodes military capacity's bargaining power in foreign policy and renders decision-makers' strategic options uncertain. In an environment of uncertainty, decision-makers may be compelled to adopt more conservative postures due to the risk of being unable to fully employ their existing capacities. Uncertainty generates costs not only for the opposing party but also for decision-makers themselves; this cost becomes particularly pronounced in crisis scenarios requiring rapid decisions. Recent studies indicating the capacity of technology supply networks to produce political pressure support this finding (Farrell & Newman, 2019). In this context, the concept of weaponized interdependence maintains its validity in the military technology domain as well (Bromley et al., 2025). Thus, external dependence must be evaluated not as a temporary weakness but as one of the structural constraints of foreign policy.

The study reveals that deterrence constitutes a multilayered phenomenon and that these layers operate in different fashions depending on the indigenous production and external dependence variables. This multilayered character demonstrates that deterrence encompasses not only threat communication but also capacity sustainability and employment freedom dimensions. Deterrence depends not only upon military capacity magnitude but upon capacity sustainability, integration freedom, and the probability of employment independent of political constraints. Indigenous production depth performs a binding role among these layers, while external dependence can fragment these layers. This fragmentation explains why actors appearing to possess the same military capacity display different foreign policy performances. Apparent capacity equality does not signify actual employability equality; this situation clearly reveals the inadequacy of traditional power measurements. The necessity of treating deterrence as a graduated and conditional concept offers a structural expansion to the classical deterrence literature (Morgan, 2012; Jervis, 1976). Consequently, deterrence must be conceptualized as a dynamic process that varies according to context rather than a "present/absent" dichotomy.

The theoretical contribution of the study derives from its integration of the relationships among military technology, deterrence, and foreign policy success within a holistic framework. This holistic approach necessitates an interdisciplinary perspective and brings together the fields of security studies, defense economics, and foreign policy analysis on a single analytical plane. In the existing literature, these relationships have mostly been addressed in fragmented fashion; while defense industry studies have discussed indigenous production and dependence issues, they have not established systematic connections with foreign policy outcomes, and the deterrence literature has neglected technology's production and supply dimensions. This study transcends this fragmented structure by integrating indigenous production, external dependence, and deterrence concepts within a single analytical framework. This integration offers an original mechanism model explaining the transformation process of military power into foreign policy. Realism's power emphasis and the dependence literature's network approach are synthesized in the context of military technology, proposing an original theoretical model (Mearsheimer, 2001; Farrell & Newman, 2019). This model repositions military technology not merely as an instrument of foreign policy but as a structural condition shaping the foreign policy space itself. Thus, the study offers a lasting analytical contribution to the international relations and security studies literature.

The study's findings also demonstrate that military technology's symbolic and perceptual dimension is as determinative as material capacity. This finding is also consistent with the perception and meaning construction processes emphasized by constructivist approaches in international relations and contributes to the realist-constructivist dialogue. As indigenous production capacity increases, the congruence between discourse regarding military power and actual capacity strengthens, and this congruence contributes to foreign policy messages being perceived more credibly. Discourse-capacity congruence constitutes one of the fundamental sources of reputation and credibility in international relations. Reputation carries the character of a strategic asset that, once damaged, takes a long time to reconstruct. By contrast, external dependence can render foreign policy discourse more cautious and conditional; this situation can lead to deterrent signals

being perceived weakly by the opposing party. The literature regarding the determinative effect of perception and signal consistency on deterrence supports this conclusion (Jervis, 1976). Consequently, military power must be addressed not only as operational capacity but simultaneously as a communicative instrument. This approach incorporates perception and signaling dimensions more strongly into foreign policy analysis.

The study reveals that the temporal dimension plays a critical role in the balance between indigenous production and external dependence. Temporal dynamics render visible the transformation processes that static analyses cannot capture and lend a dynamic perspective to policy evaluations. In the short term, high-technology systems obtained through external procurement can provide rapid visibility in deterrence; however, in the medium and long term, the maintenance, update, and integration processes of these systems can deepen dependence channels. This deepening can lead to constraints initially unnoticed becoming pronounced over time and to the narrowing of strategic maneuver space. By contrast, indigenous production investments, even if they produce limited results initially, increase control depth over time and render deterrence credibility more stable. Recent studies arguing that technology restrictions can trigger substitution innovation processes support this finding (Liu, 2024). Consequently, foreign policy success is more closely associated with long-term capacity construction than short-term gains. This finding emphasizes the importance of strategic patience and long-term perspective in defense planning.

The findings demonstrate that the balance between indigenous production and external dependence is even more sensitive for medium-scale and rising powers. This sensitivity derives from the continuous tension these actors experience between their desire for technological leapfrogging and dependence risk. These actors, while requiring access to advanced technologies on one hand, must manage dependence risks on the other. These countries, occupying a position more exposed to constraint regimes and technology pressures compared to great powers, are required to address foreign policy objectives and defense industry preferences in coordination during their military modernization processes. This coordination requires institutional capacity and strategic planning competency; the absence of this competency can diminish the foreign policy returns of modernization efforts. Otherwise, military capacity increase may not produce the expected flexibility and maneuver space in foreign policy. Findings in the strategic autonomy literature correspond strongly with this conclusion (Fiott, 2019). Consequently, foreign policy success is associated with capacity management and effective structuring of the dependence profile rather than power magnitude. This conclusion carries the character of a critical warning that must be taken into account in strategic planning processes, particularly for rising powers.

The study also reveals the necessity of evaluating military technologies through domain-specific dependence profiles. This necessity emphasizes the inadequacy of uniform defense industry policies and the strategic importance of sectoral differentiation. The dependence profiles of systems employed in naval, air, space, and cyber domains diverge markedly from one another. The effect of external dependence emerges more rapidly and invisibly, particularly in software, data processing, and network-centric warfare systems; even relatively minor constraints in these domains can seriously affect deterrence credibility. Dependencies in cyber and space domains, unlike traditional platform dependence, can produce instantaneous and difficult-to-reverse consequences. By contrast, in some platform-based systems, indigenous production can provide faster control acquisition. The literature indicating that technology domains carry different risk profiles supports this finding (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019). Consequently, indigenous production strategies must be designed with domain-specific prioritization logic rather than uniform approaches. This differentiated approach also carries critical importance for effective resource utilization.

The study's findings regarding the economic dimension demonstrate that the traditional separation between security and economic domains is increasingly blurring under contemporary conditions. This blurring increases the importance of the political economy perspective in security studies and necessitates interdisciplinary approaches. In situations where external dependence is high, economic vulnerabilities can directly reflect into the security domain and narrow foreign policy maneuver space. Supply chain interruptions or economic pressure instruments can directly affect military capacity operability, thereby weakening deterrence. The complexity of global supply chains makes predicting and managing such interruptions increasingly difficult. By contrast, strengthening indigenous production capacity increases economic resilience and renders foreign policy decisions more resistant to economic pressures. Recent discussions conducted within the framework of the weaponized interdependence concept support this finding at the theoretical level (Woods, 2025). Consequently, military modernization strategies must be addressed with a holistic perspective that also incorporates the economic security dimension. This holistic perspective strengthens the structural foundations of foreign policy success.

The study's conclusions demonstrate that, for policymakers, indigenous production capacity must be evaluated not merely as a defense industry matter but as a strategic foreign policy investment. This change in perspective offers a new framework for justifying defense expenditures and requires that the foreign policy dimension be taken into account in budget allocations. Defense industry policies must be addressed not only through military effectiveness or economic returns but also through the implementability and predictability of foreign policy decisions. As indigenous production depth increases, external actors' capacity to apply constraints during crisis moments diminishes, and the option set of foreign policy decision-makers expands. The expanding option set enables a stronger position to be obtained in diplomatic bargaining and more flexible behavior in crisis management. This expansion increases diplomatic bargaining power and strengthens strategic flexibility. Recent studies indicating that this connection between defense industry and strategic autonomy is progressively strengthening support this policy implication (Fiott, 2019; Freedman, 2019). Consequently, planning defense investments together with diplomatic capacity constitutes the structural foundations of foreign policy success.

The second important policy implication concerns the reality that complete elimination of external dependence may not be realistic in the short term, but effective management of the dependence profile is possible. This realistic approach acknowledges the costs of pursuing absolute autonomy and foregrounds the concept of relative autonomy. This management requires, first and foremost, the systematic mapping of dependence layers. Clear determination of which subsystems depend on which suppliers and to what extent constitutes the foundation of risk assessment. This mapping process necessitates a continuously updated monitoring mechanism

at the institutional level. Subsequently, prioritizing the development of indigenous production capacity at critical dependence nodes carries importance for effective resource utilization. Supplier diversification and alternative source development strategies can perform a complementary function in reducing dependence risks. This strategic approach increases military capacity's employability as a foreign policy instrument and reinforces deterrence credibility.

The third policy implication concerns the necessity of addressing defense planning and foreign policy strategy in coordination at the institutional level. This coordination requires overcoming the silo mentality in existing bureaucratic structures and strengthening inter-institutional communication channels. In existing structures, defense industry decisions are mostly evaluated through technical and economic parameters, and foreign policy consequences can remain in secondary position. Yet the findings demonstrate that defense industry preferences directly affect foreign policy performance. This direct effect necessitates the establishment of systematic consultation mechanisms between defense and foreign affairs ministries. For this reason, it is recommended that institutional mechanisms be established in which military modernization decisions are systematically evaluated for compatibility with foreign policy objectives. These mechanisms can ensure that the long-term foreign policy costs of short-term procurement solutions are taken into account. Additionally, prioritizing dependence profiles in different technology domains according to foreign policy risks can render decision-making processes more conscious. Thus, the institutional disconnection between defense and foreign policy can be addressed.

The fourth policy implication concerns the role of alliance relationships in dependence management. Alliances affect dependence dynamics in complex fashion as both security umbrellas and technological cooperation platforms. The findings demonstrate that alliance membership does not completely eliminate external dependence but rather reconfigures it in some contexts. Intra-alliance technology sharing and joint production initiatives can reduce dependence in certain domains; however, this situation can also produce new forms of alliance-specific dependence. These new forms of dependence are shaped by intra-alliance power asymmetries and can produce unique challenges for smaller partners. Consequently, alliance policies must also be evaluated from the perspective of dependence management. Preserving national control capacity in joint production projects and securing absorption and development rights in technology transfer agreements carry importance in this context. This balanced approach can enable the preservation of strategic autonomy without weakening alliance solidarity. Thus, foreign policy success can be strengthened in both cooperation and autonomy dimensions.

The study also contains certain limitations that must be taken into account when interpreting its findings. Clear statement of these limitations is a requirement of academic integrity and ensures that findings are evaluated in proper context. First, since the analysis is constructed upon specific case studies and comparative evaluations, the generalizability of findings may remain limited by contextual conditions. Since each country's industrial infrastructure, alliance relationships, and strategic environment differ, the direct transferability of results requires careful evaluation. Contextual differences can cause the proposed mechanisms to operate at different intensities and in different forms. This limitation derives from the nature of qualitative research and does not invalidate the findings (Gerring, 2007). Second, measuring the invisible dimensions of external dependence contains methodological difficulties. Elements such as software dependence, integration constraints, or indirect supply chain risks cannot always be directly observed; this situation creates certain limitations in the data collection process. Third, since measuring deterrence perception contains subjective evaluations, epistemological caution is required in interpreting findings.

Despite these limitations, the study offers a robust analytical framework for understanding the relationship between military technology and foreign policy success. The robustness of this framework derives from the triad of theoretical consistency, empirical support, and logical coherence. The limitations must be evaluated not as the study's weakness but as appropriateness to the complex nature of the phenomenon under examination. The differentiation of the effects of indigenous production and external dependence variables according to context prevents the recommendation of uniform policy prescriptions; instead, an analytical evaluation framework is offered. This framework aims to equip decision-makers with situational analysis competency rather than normative prescriptions. This framework enables decision-makers to more consciously deliberate upon the foreign policy consequences of military capacity investments in their own contexts. The causal mechanisms set forth by the study are testable in different contexts, and this situation increases the scientific value of the findings. Consequently, the limitations can also be read as areas for methodological development for future research.

The study proposes various directions for future research. These directions carry the potential to expand and deepen the research agenda opened by the present study. The first direction concerns the comparative analysis of dependence profiles across different technology domains. The dependence structures of systems employed in naval, air, land, space, and cyber domains diverge markedly from one another; systematic examination of the effects of these differences on foreign policy outcomes can contribute to developing domain-specific strategies. This comparative perspective will enable defense industry policies to be designed in more detailed fashion. The dependence dynamics in software and artificial intelligence-based systems in particular display different patterns from traditional platform dependence and require original research questions. This comparative approach will make it possible to offer policymakers more detailed and targeted recommendations. Existing findings indicating that technology domains carry different risk profiles point to the productivity of this research line (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2019).

The second research direction is the deepening of the effect of intra-alliance dependence relationships on foreign policy. Dependence in the alliance context emerges as an unavoidable by-product of security cooperation and requires original analytical tools. The present study has demonstrated that alliance membership does not eliminate dependence but reconfigures it; however, how this reconfiguration varies across different alliance structures has not been examined in detail. The dependence profiles of smaller partners in asymmetric alliances can display different patterns from symmetric alliances. This asymmetry directly affects intra-alliance bargaining dynamics and technology sharing conditions. Additionally, under what conditions intra-alliance technology sharing strengthens strategic autonomy and under what conditions it produces new forms of dependence must be systematically investigated. This research line can provide theoretical foundation for evaluating alliance policies from the

perspective of dependence management. Thus, the tension between security cooperation and strategic autonomy can be better understood.

The third research direction concerns how technology restrictions trigger substitution innovation processes. This direction aims to investigate that dependence can have not only constraining but also transformative effects under certain conditions. The findings suggest that external dependence can perform a function of mobilizing indigenous innovation capacity under certain conditions, not only a constraining function. Under what conditions embargo or technology restrictions trigger indigenous production and under what conditions they lead to permanent technological regression can be examined through long-term case studies. Determination of these conditions will provide policymakers with valuable information regarding strategies for coping with restrictions. This dynamic perspective will render visible that dependence relationships are not static but structures that transform over time. Recent studies regarding the effect of technology restrictions on substitution innovation support the productivity of this research line (Liu, 2024). This direction can also guide policymakers regarding strategies for transforming restrictions into opportunities.

The fourth research direction concerns methodological innovations. Methodological development will enable the theoretical framework set forth by the study to be tested in broader samples. The present study has adopted a qualitative approach, and the generalizability of findings has remained limited by contextual conditions. Future research can enable findings to be tested in broader samples by developing quantitative indicators that measure indigenous production depth and external dependence levels. Development of these indicators requires clarification of concepts' operational definitions and standardization of data collection protocols. Supporting quantitative indicators with qualitative analyses can increase both the generalizability and contextual depth of findings. Additionally, developing innovative methods for measuring deterrence perception can contribute to overcoming methodological difficulties in this domain. Mixed-method designs can enable the causal mechanisms set forth by the study to be validated at different levels. This methodological diversity will strengthen cumulative progress in the literature.

The fifth research direction concerns testing the study's theoretical framework in different contexts. This testing process requires a systematic effort aimed at determining the model's generalizability scope and boundary conditions. The proposed indigenous production, external dependence, and deterrence mechanism can be tested in different country groups and historical periods to evaluate the model's explanatory power. Comparisons among great powers, medium-scale powers, and small states can reveal under what conditions the model offers stronger explanation. This comparative perspective will render visible how structural differences among power categories affect the mechanism's operation. Additionally, historical case studies can enable testing the model's validity in different technological eras. This comparative and historical perspective will clarify the theoretical framework's boundaries and application domain. Thus, the study's contribution to the literature can be strengthened through future research and transform into a cumulative knowledge production process.

In conclusion, this study has revealed that the effect of high-technology military capabilities on foreign policy success is conditional, indirect, and structural. This triple characterization reflects the complexity and multidimensionality of the relationship between military power and foreign policy. Possessing military technology cannot be evaluated independently of the production and supply conditions of this technology; what proves determinative is the extent to which capacity can be operated under national control and the extent to which it is perceived as reliable by the opposing party. These two dimensions constitute both the material and perceptual foundations of deterrence and mutually reinforce one another. Indigenous production depth and external dependence level emerge as the fundamental structural factors determining deterrence credibility. The study has repositioned military technology not merely as an instrument of foreign policy but as a structural condition shaping the foreign policy space itself. This approach offers an original theoretical synthesis by integrating realism's power emphasis with the dependence literature's network perspective (Mearsheimer, 2001; Farrell & Newman, 2019; Freedman, 2019). The relationship between military power and foreign policy success can be fully understood only when production and supply relationships are taken into account; this study fills an important gap in the literature by offering a systematic contribution to this understanding. Thus, the study aims to constitute a lasting reference point for both academic knowledge accumulation and policy applications.

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