THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY AGE-BASED RETIREMENT OF QUALIFIED AND EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL ON STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY IN FOREIGN POLICY

Abstract

This study examines the effects of mandatory age-based retirement on strategic efficiency in foreign policy from an interdisciplinary perspective. The research presents an original conceptual framework positioned at the intersection of public administration, organizational behavior, international relations, and aging studies literatures. The central argument contends that automatic retirement mechanisms based on chronological age produce multidimensional adverse effects on strategic efficiency through institutional memory loss, diminished experience density, disruption of intergenerational knowledge transfer, and weakened inter-institutional coordination capacity. The research demonstrates that these effects are amplified particularly in the foreign policy domain through a "multiplier effect" mechanism, as foreign policy decisions are made under conditions of high uncertainty, multi-actor complexity, and elevated error costs.

Employing comparative policy analysis and thematic content analysis methods, the study proposes a health-based flexible retirement model grounded in the scientific consensus that chronological age alone is not a reliable indicator of performance. This model envisions qualified and experienced personnel continuing in their positions without restrictions until age 75; undergoing biennial health board evaluations between ages 75-81; and annual evaluations thereafter. Research findings indicate that the proposed model could generate positive effects on decision quality, institutional continuity, intergenerational complementarity, and strategic foresight capacity. The study frames the reconsideration of mandatory retirement age not as a short-term personnel arrangement but as a long-term institutional investment that strengthens national strategic capacity.